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Patent Accidents: Questioning Strict Liability in Patent Law 
 
Patrick R. Goold* 
 
Abstract 
 
Accidental infringement of patent rights is a pervasive and growing problem 
in the Information Age. As IP rights proliferate and expand in scope, it is 
becoming increasingly easy for companies and individuals to inadvertently 
infringe patents. When such accidental infringement occurs, patent law holds 
the infringer strictly liable. This contrasts with many areas of tort law where 
defendants are only liable if they act negligently.  
 
This Article questions the normative desirability of strict liability in patent 
infringement cases. Assuming the primary value of patent law is utilitarian, 
the Article poses the research question: What liability rule  will maximize 
social welfare? The Article answers the question theoretically by applying 
economic models of accidents developed in tort law literature. The research 
finds that a negligence rule is preferable. Unlike strict liability, negligence 
liability will encourage both patentees and technology users to take 
reasonable measures to prevent accidental infringement, and thus minimize 
the social cost of patent accidents. Therefore, the Article recommends 
reforms to the liability rule in direct patent infringement cases. Defendants 
should be liable for accidental patent infringement only when they fail to 
adopt reasonable care to avoid the infringement.  
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 I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1999, Canadian company, Research in Motion (RIM), launched the 
Blackberry email pager.1 The pager was an instant commercial success 
amongst businesspeople and politicians alike. Behind the Blackberry’s 
success was its wireless email technology. No longer were emails confined 
to the desktop but were now easily accessible on-the-go. The technology for 
which had been invented by RIM founder Mike Lazaridis in the mid-1990s; 
or so Lazaridis thought. The following year, RIM received a letter from a 
small Virginia-based company called NTP.2 The letter alleged that the 
Blackberry infringed patents NTP held covering wireless technology that an 
engineer, Thomas Campana, had invented in the mid-1980s. This 
infringement letter came as a shock to RIM. Only a few months earlier RIM 
 
* Patrick R. Goold, Lecturer in Law, The City Law School. The author would like to 
thank BJ Ard, Oren Bracha, Tun Jen Chiang, Yotam Kaplan, Oskar Liivak, Henry Smith for 
comments on the Article. The author would also like to thank Michael Meurer, Jim Balsillie, 
Sean Silcoff, Terry J. Zakreski QC, for helpful discussions on the topic. Special gratitude is 
owed to Oskar Liivak who initially coined the term “Patent Accidents”. All errors and 
omissions are the responsibility of the author. Copyright in the work is retained by the author.  
1 See JACQUIE MCNISH & SEAN SILCOFF, LOSING THE SIGNAL: THE UNTOLD STORY 
BEHIND THE EXTRAORDINARY RISE AND SPECTACULAR FALL OF BLACKBERRY 67-78 (2018). 
Later, in 2002/3, the Blackberry would evolve into the more famous mobile cell phone.  
2 Id. at 123. 
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had received its own US patent on Blackberry’s email technology.3 As far as 
RIM was concerned they had created the technology and had the patent to 
prove it! Yet NTP won their infringement case in Virginia, securing an 
injunction that threatened to bring the production of Blackberries to a halt.4 
To avoid a complete shutdown, RIM ultimately paid NTP an exorbitant 
license fee of $612.5 million in 2006.5 But should RIM have been held 
responsible for this patent infringement? Ought we to hold companies liable 
for infringing patents of which they were unaware and could not reasonably 
have been expected to know about? In most areas of civil law one is only 
liable for such accidents if one has behaved negligently.6 Run a pedestrian 
over in your car and you will only be accountable if you failed to take the 
care of a reasonable person. But infringe a patent accidentally and you are 
liable even if you behaved exactly as society would expect. Why is patent 
law the exception? 
Accidental patent infringement is a pervasive and growing problem. 
Property rights in tangible property can only be infringed by a limited number 
of individuals who are in close physical proximity to the tangible good. By 
contrast, due to the nature of intangibles, patents can be infringed by multiple 
people regardless of their location. Furthermore, unlike physical goods, with 
readily ascertainable boundaries, the scope of patent boundaries is 
unpredictable. Ideally a nation’s patent register ought to give the public a 
clear picture of what is, and what is not, subject to a patent. But patent law 
literature already provides evidence of a number of barriers and obstacles 
which prevent registers performing this function as well as we would hope.7 
As a result, it is all too easy for even a diligent company to become an 
accidental infringer, and the amount of such infringement is worrisome. 
Scholars of patent law today describe the problem of inadvertent patent 
infringement as “significant” and “getting worse”.8 Recent empirical 
evidence hints that perhaps as much as 89% of litigated patent infringements 
are unintentional and inadvertent.9 Buy a wireless router to use in your small 
 
3 Id. See also Pager Maker Gets Patent for E-Mail Delivery, WALL. ST. J. (May 18, 
2001).  
4 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. 270 F. Supp. 2d 751 (D. Va. 2003). 
5 ‘RIM's Sensible Patent Payout Keeps BlackBerry Users Hooked’, WALL ST. J. (March 
6, 2006) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114160357490989930. 
6 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 437, at 842 (2011); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG 
& BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 265-66 
(2010) (strict liability exists at “the margins of tort,” and is applicable in “a few special 
situations”). 
7 See infra Part II.B. 
8 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 47 (2009). 
9 Christopher A. Cotriopia &  Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421 (2009). 
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business, and you may unknowingly be using technology that was not 
licensed by the proprietor; incorporate Bluetooth technology into a new 
cellphone after searching the patent register, and you may be inadvertently 
manufacturing a technology whose patent information was buried under a 
mountain of similar patents; grow crops on your farm and you may later find 
such crops germinated from patented seeds which were blown by the wind 
from nearby farm land.  
This Article questions the role of strict liability in accidental 
infringement cases. This is not an uncontroversial question; the strict liability 
standard in patent law is hotly debated.10 Those in favor of a strict liability 
standard have argued that a fault-based liability rule would be too 
administratively costly to implement, that such a rule may in fact harm the 
diffusion of new ideas in research environments, and that strict liability is 
necessary to ensure the patent holder’s incentives. On the other end of the 
spectrum, some argue that patent law ought to include an “independent 
invention” defense, under which no liability would attach to making, using, 
or selling a patented technology if the defendant has independently re-created 
the patented technology. Commentators who propose this rule argue that 
strict liability for those who independently invent technology impedes 
research and development, and leads to higher patent litigation costs. Some 
scholars, such as Chiang,11 and Blair and Cotter,12 fall somewhere in the 
middle of these two poles; it is on their work that this present Article builds.13  
Assuming the primary justification for patent rights is utilitarian, this 
Article provides a theoretical economic analysis of accidental patent 
infringement.14 Patent scholars have already argued that transaction costs 
prevent technology users and patentees from ex ante bargaining in cases of 
patent accidents, and that these cases should be governed by a liability rule 
rather than a property rule.15 By asking what type of liability rule is most 
appropriate (strict liability or negligence), this Article extends that analysis 
one step further. Following models developed in the economics of accidents 
 
10 See infra Part II.C. 
11 Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
12 Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alternatives in Patent Law, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 799 (2002). 
13 See also Oskar Liivak, Negligent Innovation (forthcoming). 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 Mark A. Lemley, & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information? 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (following the theoretical framework in Guido 
Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)). BJ Ard has further argued that property 
law adopts less property rues than IP lawyers commonly appreciate and that IP should 
likewise shift to a more liability rule regime. See BJ Ard, More Property Rules than 
Property: Revisiting the Right to Exclude in IP, 68 EMORY L.J. 685 (2019). 
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literature,16 the Article determines which liability rule will reduce the total 
cost society spends on accidental patent infringement. The Article concludes 
that a negligence rule best fulfils this goal. Under a strict liability rule, 
technology users will adopt reasonable care to avoid accidentally incurring 
liability, but the patentee’s incentives to avoid such accidents (e.g. through 
providing appropriate notice of their rights) is less than optimal. By contrast, 
a negligence rule is preferable because it creates incentives for both 
technology users and patentees to adopt reasonable, cost-justified, care to 
avoid accidents. As a result, the number of patent accidents is reduced, saving 
society’s resources. More difficult is the question: Which version of a 
negligence rule will best achieve this goal? While both a simple negligence 
rule and a contributory negligence rule could feasibly improve social welfare, 
the Article presents various reasons for preferring a simple negligence rule.17 
To implement such a liability rule, the Article recommends that patent 
law adopt a “patent negligence” defense.18 In accident cases, a user ought to 
avoid liability by proving that she adopted all reasonable care to prevent any 
accidental patent infringement. Reasonable care may include performing a 
diligent search of the patent register, inspecting relevant products for patent 
information, or reviewing the patent portfolios of competitor companies, for 
example. Implementing such a reform would involve a modest change to 
judicial practice. Indeed, United Kingdom courts already adopt a “quasi-
negligence” rule by denying damages in cases where the defendants did not 
know of the patent and had no “reasonable grounds” for supposing such a 
patent existed.19 In such cases, courts should also use their equitable 
discretion to deny injunctive relief. In the U.S., under Section 287 of the 
Patent Act, courts deny damages in cases where the patentee has failed to 
appropriately mark patented products.20 As will be seen, this current rule 
imperfectly approximates a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory 
negligence defense.21 However, rather than focus on the patentee’s level of 
care, this Article recommends instead that courts focus on the user’s level of 
care, and deny damages and injunctions when the technology user has taken 
all reasonable measures to avoid the infringement occurring. This 
modification is not only well within the judiciary’s authority but would also 
 
16 See infra Part III. 
17 The article does also find, however, the case for negligence in patent law is weaker 
than in copyright law, due to the existence of mandatory registration in the former but not 
the latter. See Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025 
(2016). 
18 See Infra Part IV.B. 
19 See Infra Part IV.A. 
20 35 U.S.C. §287.  
21 See Infra Part IV.A. 
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provide a satisfactory middle-ground between proposals to retain the strict 
liability standard and proposals to adopt an independent invention defense.  
Adopting such a modification has the potential to alleviate many 
problems in the contemporary patent system.22 In particular, the proposal 
would help curb abusive behavior of non-practicing entities (or patent 
“trolls”). Currently, non-practicing entities can pray on the inadvertent 
infringer: by sending a cease and desist letter, the troll can threaten to shut 
down small businesses who accidentally infringe the patent.23 The patent 
negligence defense, by contrast, would provide a powerful tool for small 
businesses in fighting patent troll behavior. Businesses will be able insulate 
themselves from litigation claims from trolls by taking steps that a reasonable 
company would in order to prevent any accidental infringement; leaving only 
those who behave negligently to fight such claims in court. Furthermore, a 
negligence rule would provide patentees with incentives to write clearer 
patent claims, and thus help address the contemporary concern that the patent 
system encourages patentees to strategically word claims in ambiguous ways 
to receive expanded protection.  
At this point, some may object: Will eliminating strict liability in 
accident cases depress incentives for innovation, thus harming society in the 
future? To which the Article responds: adopting a negligence rule may in 
some instances cause economic harm to the patentee, but society as a whole 
will benefit. In 1970, Guido Calabresi famously demonstrated that the 
optimal level of personal injury accidents in tort law was not, contrary to 
public opinion, zero.24  Road traffic accidents, in particular, cause severe 
harm to individuals and broader society. However, adopting measures to 
prevent those accidents is also costly. In many cases, the cost of the measures 
required to prevent accidents would be greater than the expected harm caused 
by the accidents themselves.25 As a result, society makes a choice to tolerate 
some road traffic accidents because it is better for society as a whole. Our 
goal is not to eliminate all accidents, but instead encourage parties to invest 
reasonable, cost-justified, levels of resources into accident-avoidance.26 The 
same is true of patent infringement today. Accidental infringement of patent 
rights harms the patentee and in turn future society. However, the measures 
required to prevent accidental infringement can at times be onerous. In some 
cases, where the chances of an accident are slim but the costs of avoidance 
 
22 Id. 
23 Reitzig et al, On Sharks, Trolls, and their Patent Prey – Unrealistic damage awards 
for firms’ strategies of “being infringed” 36 RESEARCH POLICY 134 (2007) (“the even 
greater concern of today’s leading R&D multilaterals of potentially overlooking these (often 
small) inventors’ patents and being caught in the trap of inadvertent infringement.”) 
24 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 17-24 (1970). 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
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are high, society would be economically better off by simply letting the 
accident happen, rather than investing inefficiently in avoidance mechanisms. 
As explored in this Article, a negligence rule achieves this delicate balancing 
goal. 
The Article continues in three Parts. Part II defines accidental 
infringement of patents and offers a number of illustrations. This Part 
explains in more detail the causes of such accidental infringements and 
summarizes the literature on the optimal liability rule in patent law. Part III 
applies economic theory of accidents to the issue of patent accidents. The 
analysis reveals the case for some version of a negligence liability rule. Part 
IV discusses how best to implement a negligence rule and applies the 
suggested rule to demonstrate how such a law would solve a number of 
contemporary patent problems. Due to space considerations, Part IV provides 
reform recommendations in relation to the U.S. and U.K. law only, with the 
expectation that lawyers in other jurisdictions will translate these 
recommendations into their own domestic laws. Part V briefly concludes. 
 II.  PATENT ACCIDENTS 
Anglo-American patent law holds all infringers strictly liable.27 Since 
the 19th century, courts have imposed liability upon anyone who makes, uses, 
or sells a patented invention, regardless of whether the defendant’s 
infringement was committed intentionally, negligently, or entirely 
innocently.28 This stands in contrast to many areas of civil law where a 
defendant is only accountable for unintentional injuries if she failed to take 
reasonable care.29 Yet, as this Part demonstrates, accidental infringement of 
patents is all too common. Section A describes accidental infringement of 
patents in greater detail. Section B discusses some of the main causes of 
patent accidents. Section C reviews the academic literature debating whether 
 
27 For an alternative interpretation see Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort 
Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 572 (2016) (arguing that patent infringement requires 
intentional conduct). Cf Patrick R. Goold, Intent in Patent Infringement, 68 FLA. L. REV. F 
72 (2017) (arguing that intentional conduct, in both trespass and patent infringement, is not 
a fault standard). For a related discussion of “objective” fault standards in the area of indirect 
patent infringement, see Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent 
Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575 (2011). 
28 Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587. 607-08 (1850) (“The intent not to infringe…never 
exonerates…from all damage for the actual injury or encroachment, though it may mitigate 
them.”); ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA §337, AT 292 (1883) (“To constitute an infringement of a patent, it is not necessary 
that the infringer should have known of the existence of the patent at the time he infringed 
it; or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary that he should have known his doings to 
constitute an infringement.”). See generally Lynda J. Oswald, The Strict Liability of Direct 
Patent Infringement, 19 VA. J. ENT. & TECH L. 993, 999-1005 (2017). 
29 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6.  
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patent liability ought to be imposed strictly or whether some form of a fault 
standard should be introduced.  
A.  The Anatomy of Patent Accidents 
Broadly speaking, patent infringement can be divided into two types: 
intentional and accidental. For the purposes of this Article, patent 
infringement is “intentional” when, prior to the infringement, the defendant 
was aware that her planned course of action would involve patent 
infringement but nevertheless engaged in such conduct; for example, if A 
owns a patent on a new type of mousetrap, and B knowingly sells copies of 
the mousetrap in order to undercut A in the market.30 Like all forms of 
intentional tort, determining whether the wrongdoing is intentional requires, 
in theory, an understanding of the defendant’s subjective state of mind.31 
However, as it is difficult to accurately discern the content of a defendant’s 
mental state, in common judicial practice, intent is typically inferred from 
more objective factors which serve as suitable proxies. 32 Courts routinely 
find patent infringement was intended by examining the probabilistic 
relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the likelihood of 
infringement: if prior to commencing the conduct, there was a near certainty 
 
30 The concept of “intent” in patent law, as in law and philosophy generally, is debated. 
Peter Cane describes the concept of intent as being used “loosely” in tort law, sometimes 
used to refer to voluntariness, sometimes used to refer to describe motive, see Peter Cane, 
Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 533, 555 (2000). Nevertheless, the use of 
“intent” in this article is relatively definite. As used here, the term intent is used 
synonymously with the use of “willfulness” when assessing patent damages, see generally 
Matthew D. Powers, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Wilful Patent Infringement, 
51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 (2001). Thus, intentional patent infringement, as used here, 
involves some element of mens rea in the literal sense of a guilty or blameworthy mental 
state. As a result, simply performing some conduct deliberately which later turns out to be a 
patent infringement, but without awareness of the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of 
acting, is not regarded as intentional here (and accordingly this article’s use of intent is not 
to be confused with that in Vishnubhakat, supra note 27). However, this Article is not a work 
of conceptual analysis, and I do not claim this is the only or in some sense “right” 
understanding of intent in patent law. The intentional-accidental divide the article draws is 
used primarily to define the boundaries of a class of accidental infringement cases which, as 
we shall see, requires a separate consideration if the law is to reach an efficient allocation of 
resources.  
31 See Cane, supra note 30, at 534 (describing the core of intent as involving some 
element of “choice” which is necessarily subjective). 
32 Famously, in legal literature, this point was argued in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., 
THE COMMON LAW  27 (1881). Albeit, Holmes’ may well have been arguing that the law 
never truly imposes liability depending on subjective mental states, but in fact ‘really’ 
imposes external and objective standards of conduct. This idea has continued through many 
economists understanding of tort law to today, see  RICHARD POSNER & WILLIAM M. 
LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 149-159. 
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that such conduct would involve a patent infringement, courts are likely to 
find patent infringement was intended.33  
Equally, however, patent infringement may be accidental. Frequently 
in social life, individuals engage in activities which are overall beneficial for 
society, but which, as a by-product, pose a risk of harm to others around us. 
At the time the individual engages in the relevant conduct, it is far from 
certain that the conduct will harm someone else, although it is surely possible. 
Sometimes that risk materializes into a reality and causes harm to others, even 
though that is not our desire or intention.34 A classic example is driving 
automobiles: on balance this activity is beneficial, although it does impose 
risk of harm on others. Sometimes those risks materialize and individuals are 
injured, although that was an outcome that no one wished to occur. The same 
situation occurs frequently in patent law. The process of innovation is socially 
beneficial, but it comes with risks attached: every time an inventor creates or 
commercializes a product or process, there is a risk that doing so might 
infringe the patent rights of an earlier inventor. As we shall see in the 
following examples, sometimes that risk materializes and patent 
infringements occur, although that was clearly not the desire of any party. 
Given the choice, both parties would have tried to avoid this unfortunate 
outcome. These cases in turn pose an important and thorny policy question: 
who should bear the cost of the accident: the innocent patentee? Or the 
innocent user who did not wish for this outcome to happen? Should the harm 
lie where it falls? Or ought we use the law to shift the responsibility to the 
user?  
Accidental infringement takes a number of forms. These can be 
grouped into three broad categories. The most basic form of accidental 
infringement occurs when the user of the patented invention is aware that he 
or she is using some form of technology, but is unaware of the existence of a 
patent. Perhaps the most discussed example of this occurring is the NTP v 
RIM case, described in the introduction.35 In this case, RIM was engaged in 
a beneficial activity: inventing new types of pagers and cellphones that 
 
33 See Halo Electronics, Inv. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. 126 S.Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) 
(describing culpability in tort law as “generally measured against the knowledge of the actor 
at the time of the challenged conduct”). 
34 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1 (1987) (“[B]y 
‘accidents’ I mean harmful outcomes that neither injurers nor victims wished to occur- 
although either might have affected the likelihood or severity of the outcomes.”). Following 
this definition provided by Shavell, both negligent and non-negligent unintentional wrongs 
is described in this article as accidental. This may differ from some ordinary uses of the term 
‘accident’ which, for some, may refer only to non-negligent unintentional wrongs. This 
Article prefers to follow the more specific definition of accident found in the economic 
literature as opposed to the ordinary language interpretation of the term.  
35 Supra notes 1-6. 
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allowed individuals to receive emails wirelessly.36 When they started this 
activity, RIM was, or at the very least ought to have been, aware that such 
technical activity could possibly infringe the patents of a prior inventor. 
Ultimately, this risk materialized and a patent infringement did result. 
However, this was clearly not RIM’s intention; quite the opposite in fact.37 
RIM did not desire to commit a patent infringement, and if it was reasonably 
certain to them that their conduct would have amounted to a patent 
infringement, they likely would have avoided such infringement by licensing 
the technology from NTP. However, such ex ante bargaining was impossible 
due lack of accurate ownership information available to RIM. This resulted 
in RIM not only making and selling an infringing product, but investing 
substantial and irretrievable resources into a telecommunications network on 
which the phones would operate.38  
Similar problems arise when the technology user is the end consumer. 
At the start of twentieth century, patent attorney and inventor George Selden 
owned a US patent for an “improved road engine” powered by a “liquid-
hydrocarbon engine of the compression type.”39 Selden claimed that Ford’s 
Model T automobile infringed the patent.40 While Selden sued Ford, he also 
threatened the consumers who bought the Model T. Selden advertised that 
anyone who bought a Model T would also “buy a lawsuit.”41 Many 
consumers were likely unaware that by using the Model T, they were “using” 
technology allegedly subject to a patent, and thus possibly themselves 
infringing the patent. From their perspective, they were merely engaged in a 
socially beneficial activity – driving – and were largely unaware that this 
doing so came with a risk of patent infringement. Ironically, Selden’s threat 
to sue consumers for using the Model T helpfully limited the risk of such 
accidental infringements of the patent occurring! 
 
36 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. 270 F. Supp. 2d 751 (D. Va. 2003).  
37 Id. at 755 (noting that RIM invented the technology before awareness of NTP’s 
patents). 
38 See Research in Motion, History, available at 
http://www.blackberry.com/select/get_the_facts/pdfs/rim/rim_history.pdf (RIM had signed 
wireless handheld supply contracts with American Mobile, IBM, and Rogers Cantel (now 
AT&T)). 
39 George B. Selden, U.S. Patent 549,160, 1895 available 
https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/5f/45/7f/147a3b78f67eee/US549160.pdf.  
40 JAMES J. FLINK, THE AUTOMOBILE AGE 53 (1990).  
41 Id. Ford subsequently countered by offering to bond his customers against any patent 
infringement suit. 
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The problem of suing unwary consumers continues today.42 Consider 
for example, the case of the Innovatio lawsuits.43 Innovatio acquired patent 
rights to certain wireless Internet technologies from Broadcom.44 But rather 
than sue the manufacturers of wireless devices such as routers, like Motorola 
and Cisco, Innovatio instead sued consumers for buying and using the 
devices.45 Innovatio then sent more than 8000 infringement letters to, and 
initiated 23 lawsuits against, small businesses that had bought the wireless 
devices and were using them, for example, to provide internet to their 
consumers.46 Restaurants, cafes, hotels, bakeries, etc. were alleged to be 
“using” the patented technology and thus infringing their rights.47 Much like 
the purchasers of the Model T, most, if not all, the consumers Innovatio 
threatened were completely unaware of the existence of a patent on the 
technology they used. 
A variation on this form of accidental infringement occurs when the 
user of the technology is aware of the patent, but is unaware of a relevant 
patent claim. A famous example of such a situation is the Rambus v Infineon 
case.48 Rambus developed and patented computer memory technology used 
in semiconductor memory devices.49 Like NTP, Rambus was a patent 
assertion entity, whose primary business was the licensing of the patented 
technology.50 In 1990, Rambus applied to the USPTO for a patent over its 
“Dynamic Random Access Memory” technology.51 In 1992, Rambus joined 
the “Joint Electronic Devices Engineering Council” (JEDEC): a standard 
setting organization that developed standards for semiconductor 
technologies.52 JEDEC had a written patent policy encouraging the adoption 
of standards free of patented items or processes. Furthermore, the policy also 
 
42 See generally Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C.L. 
REV. 1443 (2014). Colleen Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being 
Sued En Masse for Patent Infringement & What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
235 (2014). See also, Daniel Nazer, Actually, Mr. Waxman, Consumers are Sued For Patent 
Infringement All the Time, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (April 30, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/actually-mr-waxman-consumers-are-sued-patent-
infringement-all-time. 
43 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp 2d 903, 906 (N.D.Ill 
2013).  
44 Id. at 907. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id 
48 Rambus, Inc. v Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F. 3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert denied, 124 
S.Ct. 227 (2003). 
49 Id. at 1084. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 1085. 
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required members to disclose patents and patent applications “related to” the 
standardization of the work of the Council. In 1993, Rambus disclosed their 
patent to the group.53 While Rambus was a member, JEDEC adopted a 
standard for synchronous dynamic random access memory to be used by 
semiconductor manufacturers.54 Semiconductor manufacturers then began to 
manufacture chips using SDRAM technology.55 In 1995, Rambus withdrew 
from JEDEC and filed a number of “continuations” on the original patent 
(continuations allow the patent holder to modify or add additional claims to 
the patent at a later date in order to broaden its scope).56 These continuations 
ripened into issued patents between 1997 and 1999. Rambus then sued 
Infineon, a manufacturer of semiconductor memory devices (including 
SDRAM), and a member of JEDEC, for infringement of the recently issued 
patents. While antitrust and fraud actions were started against Rambus, the 
patent was successfully enforced against Infineon, despite their lack of 
knowledge of the patent. More broadly, the story highlights how strategically 
hiding claims, particularly through the use of continuations, can contribute to 
patent accidents.57 
The second form of accidental infringement occurs when the 
defendant is aware that she is using technology that is subject to a patent, but 
believes that she is operating outside the patent’s scope. A classic example of 
this is the Polaroid v Kodak case.58 Polaroid had long dominated the instant 
camera market, until Kodak decided to enter the sector in the 1970s. Kodak 
was aware that Polaroid owned several patents on instant camera technology. 
Accordingly they were aware that inventing their own instant camera came 
with a substantial risk of patent infringement. To reduce this risk, Kodak 
hired a top patent lawyer to work with their technical staff.59 The patent 
 
53 Namely U.S. Patent No. 5,243,703, a divisional of the patent application Serial No 
07/510,898. 
54 Id. at 1085. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 1084. Perhaps even more unsettling, Rambus learned information through their 
participation in the standard setting process that allowed them to write claims that covered 
the standard. See Bessen and Meurer, supra note 8, at 62. 
57 Many proposals have been made to end such abuse, see generally Mark A. Lemley & 
Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 BU. L. REV. 63 (2004). But 
yet the problem of hidden claims remains. Particularly troublesome are cases where the 
patentee adds or modifies claims (to the extent their initial written description allows) to 
anticipate new products produced by competitors, see id. at 74-76. 
58 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co. 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also 
RONALD K. FIERSTEIN, A TRIUMPH OF GENIUS: EDWIN LAND, POLAROID, AND THE KODAK 
PATENT WAR Chapter 9-12 (2015). 
59 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co. 1990 WL 324105, 76  (D. Mass. 1990) (“During 
the lengthy and detailed patent clearance process he performed for Kodak, Mr. Carr 
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lawyer gave advice about design choices to avoid infringement.60 At the end 
of the process, Kodak produced a camera that worked in a way entirely in 
reverse of the Polaroid product.61 Nevertheless, Polaroid sued Kodak and 
received significant damages.62 The judge praised Kodak for taking such care 
to avoid infringement, but nevertheless found them liable.63 These types of 
accidental infringement may be called “boundary accidents” rather than 
“ownership accidents,” as the defendant is aware of who owns the 
technology, but is simply unaware of the scope of the patent right. In this 
Article, we shall put “boundary accidents” to one side, and thus avoid 
assessing the merits of “designing around patents” for the time being. The 
focus in this Article is more firmly on ownership accidents.  
 Of course, the boundaries between ownership and boundary accidents 
blur in some cases, as illustrated by the E-Data controversy. In the 1980s, 
Charles Freeny invented a kiosk that was used by consumers in retail stores 
to create digital audio tapes.64 However, the patent issued on the technology 
was vaguely and amorphously written.65 The US patent provided the patent 
holder with the exclusive rights to a “system for reproducing information in 
material objects at a point of sale location.”66 In the early 2000s, the patent 
holding company E-Data argued that the scope of this patent’s monopoly 
covered a wide range of e-commerce.67 Companies such as Microsoft and 
IBM were, allegedly, infringing the patent, by selling downloadable music 
and software over the Internet.68  E-Data sent out 75,000 letters to websites, 
offering licenses and in return promising not to bring legal action.69 It is 
certain that a large amount of these companies were unaware of the Freeny 
patent (and had committed an “ownership accident”). The boundaries of the 
patent were so vaguely demarcated, that companies such as Microsoft and 
IBM were not aware that the technology they had adopted was subject to a 
 
considered over 250 Polaroid and non-Polaroid patents and rendered 67 written and 
countless oral opinions on both the film and camera patents.”). 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 76-79 (comparing products). 
62 Id.  
63 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co. 1990 WL 324105, 79 (D. Mass. 1990) (Judge 
Mazzone stating that the record “shows a patent clearance process that could serve as a model 
for what the law requires.”). 
64 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 8-10.  
65 Id. See also Seth Shulman, IP’s Bleak House, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (2001) 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/400914/ips-bleak-house (citing the Freeny patent as 
an example of an “absurdly broad patent” that is “fuzzy” and “likely to stymie innovation”). 
66 US Patent 4,528,643.   
67 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 8-10. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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patent right. These types of accidents accordingly fall within the scope of this 
Article’s concern.   
 Lastly, in some cases the user is completely unaware he or she is using 
the underlying technology. A famous, albeit controversial, example of this 
concerns the Monsanto Roundup Ready seeds. In 2005, Percy Schmeiser, a 
Canadian farmer, was subject to a Canadian Supreme Court case.70 Monsanto 
found Canola on Schmeiser’s farm which had been grown from their patented 
Roundup Ready Canola seeds.71 Schmeiser maintained that he had grown this 
genetically modified crop accidentally.72 Schmeiser argued that other farmers 
in the area were growing Roundup Ready Canola, and that the wind and 
insects had moved seeds from their crops onto his land, causing him to 
inadvertently grow the crop.73 While this account of events was disputed, the 
issue it presents has long concerned farmers. In the US, the Organic Seeds 
Growers and Trade Association sued Monsanto alleging that preventing this 
form of “contamination” of their organic crops required significant 
expenditure on their part (in the form of erecting hedges and wind barriers, 
special and temporal crop rotation, etc.).74 Both the Canadian and US 
Supreme Court have declined to determine the patent liability of those who 
accidentally grow patented seeds.75 
B.  The Causes of Patent Accidents 
There are many causes of the patent accident problem, most of which 
are well documented.76 In part, the problem is somewhat unavoidable due to 
the innate difficulties in assigning property rights in intangibles. The 
boundaries of patent rights will always be elusive simply because of the 
 
70 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902. Controversial because after 
the seeds had supposedly “accidentally” blown onto Schmeiser’s land, Schmeiser replanted 
the seeds in a way that was arguably an intentional infringement of the patent. This case has 
received much academic commentary. See e.g. Jessica Lynd, Gone With the Wind: Why Even 
Utility Patents Cannot Fence In Self-Replicating Technologies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 663 
(2013). 
71 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902  
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Organic Seeds Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co. 851 F.Supp. 544, 548 
(2012) (“Seed businesses and farmers may, at some expense, test their seeds and crops to 
ensure that no contamination has occurred, and non-transgenic farmers may establish buffer 
zones between themselves and farmers using transgenic seed in order to reduce the risk of 
cross-transmission.”) 
75 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (“In reaching this 
conclusion, we emphasize from the outset that we are not concerned here with the innocent 
discovery by farmers of "blow-by" patented plants on their land or in their cultivated fields.); 
Bowman v. Monsanto, 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013) (declining to rule on the issue of patent 
exhaustion in cases of technologies which replicate outside direct human control). 
76 See generally Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 38-45. 
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fundamental difficulties of describing an invention in words. This 
fundamental problem contributes significantly to cases such as Kodak.77 
However, beyond these difficulties, there are further causes which are less 
intractable; causes which, with appropriate policy responses, could be 
counteracted.   
 One notable cause is the presence of “patent thickets.” Some industry 
sectors contain “dense web[s] of overlapping intellectual property rights” that 
companies must spend countless hours scouring in order to commercialize a 
new product.78 A classic example of this problem is the smartphone industry. 
One estimate suggests that 250,000 active patents impact the smartphone 
industry today.79  Incorporating Bluetooth 3.0 technology into a phone 
requires the producer to locate and license over 30,000 patents alone.80 
Finding all the relevant patents and their owners is for most smartphone 
producers a Sisyphean task.  As a result, some commentators go as far as to 
say that full patent clearance is simply impossible.81 Under such 
circumstances, some accidental infringement is very hard to avoid.82 
Producing new smartphones is clearly a socially valuable activity, but doing 
so imposes very obvious risks of accidentally infringing the patent of another 
company. While there are measures one can take to reduce those risks, e.g. 
by searching the register, those measures are of dubious efficacy and would 
involve a very significant investment of resources. Furthermore, the problem 
is hardly limited to smartphones, but affects “virtually every modern device 
(e.g. a computer, a car, or a television).”83 In the U.K., the Hargreaves Digital 
Opportunity: Review of IP and Growth found the emergence of patent 
thickets were obstructing entry to some key markets and thus impeding 
innovation.84 
 
77 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co. 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
78 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting (2001) 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120 (2001). 
79 See Mike Masnick, There are 250,000 Active Patents That Impact Smartphones; 
Representing One in Six Active Patents Today, TECHDIRT (Oct. 18 2012). 
80 Even Engstrom, So How Many Patents Are in A Smart Phone? ENGINE (Jan. 19, 2017) 
https://www.engine.is/news/category/so-how-many-patents-are-in-a-smartphone 
(“Consider Bluetooth 3.0 - a technology incorporating the contributions of more than 30,000 
patent holders, including 200 universities…”). 
81 See Chiang, supra note 11, at 15-17. 
82 However, some have also questioned how significant the patent thicket problem really 
is. See Jonathan Barnett, Are There Really Patent Thickets? REG. 14 (2016-17) (doubting 
that patent thickets persist for any significant period of time because the market has 
incentives to arrange ways to avoid the problems – e.g. patent  pools). See also Jonathan 
Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray? 32 BERK TECH L J 1313 (2017). 
83 Id. at 15. 
84 Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth 
10 (2011). For alternative solutions to the patent thicket issue, see e.g. Miriam Marcowitz-
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 The second cause of note is the “notice failure” problem.85 Ideally, 
patents on the patent register should give others in society accurate 
information about the existence and boundaries of the patent. The clearer the 
description of the claimed invention, the easier it is for producers to avoid 
patent infringement. However, Bessen and Meurer find the U.S. patent 
system to be “critically deficient in this regard.”86 As the eData and Kodak 
cases illustrate, patent documents often do not provide sufficient notice to the 
public of either the scope of patents. As Judge Learned Hand once stated that 
patent claims “can be such a waste of abstract verbiage” and that it “takes the 
scholastic ingenuity of a St Thomas with the patience of a yogi to decipher 
their meaning.”87 The result is not only that accidental “boundary” type 
infringements occur (as in Kodak) but also it makes it more difficult for 
producers to discover whether a technology is owned and by whom (leading 
to the “ownership” type accidents). As Bessen and Meurer continue to 
describe, this notice failure plays a “crucial role” in leading to inadvertent 
infringement which is central to the rising costs of the patent system.88 
 Furthermore, the notice failure problem is not attributable simply to 
the innate difficulties of demarcating property rights in intangibles, but is, in 
large measure, a problem of institutional design. As Menell and Meurer 
demonstrate, the current patent system does not provide patent holders with 
sufficient incentives to provide the public with adequate notice.89 Instead, 
frequently inventors can “benefit from obfuscating the scope of rights and 
keeping others in the dark about intellectual property.”90 At the root of the 
problem is an externality based market failure: ownership and boundary 
information is a public good, when the patentee supplies this information, he 
or she benefits others in society but does not benefit from doing so herself.91 
As a result, the patentee faces suboptimal incentives to provide this 
information to the public.92 In fact, the opposite is the case: often the patentee 
can “benefit from strategically hiding, obfuscating, and distorting such 
information.”93 For example, in relation to the RIM v. NTP case, the authors 
 
Bitton et al, Recoupment Patents, N. CAROLINA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
85 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8 at 147 (“Simply put, notice failure and the resulting 
inadvertent infringement are central to the failure of patents to provide positive innovation 
incentives.”); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 
5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 14 (2013). 
86 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 46. 
87 Victor Talking Mach. Co. Thomas A. Edison, Inc. 229 F. 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1916). 
88 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8 at 147. 
89 Menell & Meurer, supra note 85, at 1.  
90 Menell & Meurer, supra note 85. 
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93 Id. at 9. 
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highlight how NTP were in a stronger bargaining position after RIM had 
“unwittingly invested heavily in a potentially infringing wireless email 
technology.”94 As a result, NTP “clearly benefited from its patents not being 
easily known.”95 Rambus provides a similar example of such behavior. 
Similarly, by seeking broad and vague claims, the patentee 
“maximizes the likelihood that the patent can be stretched to reach unforeseen 
competing technologies” (as illustrated by the eData) case.96 A “good” patent 
drafter will therefore try to construct claims to be ambiguous enough so that 
they can be read narrowly during the patent examination and broadly during 
patent litigation. In some cases, this involves cynical obfuscation techniques. 
Freilich recently demonstrated the problem of “patent clutter.”97 An 
astonishing 25% of claim language in her sample of U.S. patents was not 
about the patent’s core invention.98 While there are many potential reasons 
why patent holders may choose to “pad” their patent claims with irrelevant 
language, one clear reason is that doing so makes the patent document harder 
to read and understand, thus introduces ambiguity that may be exploited in 
litigation to ensure the broadest scope of protection possible.99  
C.  Literature Review 
A number of commentators have questioned the liability rule applying 
to unintentional patent infringements. Broadly these scholars have proposed 
three different solutions. The first two solutions are the most fully explored. 
These are either to maintain the strict liability standard, or alternatively, to 
adopt an independent invention defense. The last option (the most under-
explored of the three) is to adopt some form of negligence rule. This Section 
outlines these proposals in turn.  
1. Strict Liability Proposals 
The first option is to maintain the current strict liability rule for one 
who accidentally makes, uses, or sells a patented product. Writing in 2002, 
Blair and Cotter compared strict liability rules and negligence rules for 
governing patent infringement.100 The authors concluded that strict liability 
was preferable to negligence liability for administrative cost reasons.101 If 
patent law adopted a negligence rule, courts would be required to assess 
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97 Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925 (2018). 
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whether the defendant behaved reasonably.102 This would require courts to 
make a decision about the optimal amount of care the defendant should 
exercise (e.g. how much time should the patent holder search the register for? 
would it be reasonable for the patent holder to seek an infringement opinion 
letter from an attorney or patent office?). As strict liability does not require 
such a costly judicial analysis, they concluded strict liability was preferable 
to negligence.  
Nevertheless, Blair and Cotter did find that a “modified” strict 
liability rule, wherein liability was strictly imposed, but damages were 
eliminated for those who infringed without actual or constructive notice of 
the patent, was the optimal rule.103 In particular, the authors argued that 
conditioning damages upon constructive notice (namely product marking) 
would incentivize the patentee to take care to reduce the chances of 
inadvertent infringement.104 Furthermore, the authors found that in some 
instances, placing the entire responsibility to avoid inadvertent infringement 
upon the technology user could lead to the technology user to take socially 
excessive care.105  
As a result, although literature routinely cites Blair and Cotter for 
supporting the strict liability regime, their proposed liability regime is in fact 
closer to a negligence rule than is commonly perceived. As will be expanded 
upon in Part IV, the Blair and Cotter proposal is best described as a strict 
liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense, i.e. the user 
will be strictly liable for damages unless she can show the patent holder failed 
to take reasonable care to avoid the infringement by providing adequate 
notice.106 As later sections explore more fully, this proposal has many of the 
same benefits of a more straightforward negligence rule. Nevertheless, the 
proposal differs from such a rule in the following ways: the contributory 
negligence standard is defined using a bright line rule (i.e. appropriate 
marking) rather than a vague standard (i.e. did the patentee take “reasonable 
care”); and the patentee who is contributorily negligent nevertheless receives 
injunctive relief.107 
 More recently, Robert Merges has partially defended the strict 
liability rule.108 Merges focused particularly on whether courts should hold 
those who do not deliberately copy a patented invention ought to be held 
strictly liable, or alternatively, whether such defendants should be held not-
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liable (absent proof of deliberate copying).109 Merges concludes, tentatively, 
that such innocent infringers ought to be held liable. Merges asked the 
question: whether “there is anything to be said for the absolute liability 
standard”?110 To which, Merges makes a “tentative start in the direction of 
the current doctrine.”111 The strict liability rule was defended for two reasons. 
First, in many cases, the cost for the patent holder of proving copying would 
be very high, thus limiting the compensation they receive from their 
invention.112 Second, the strict liability standard may increase the 
dissemination of the technology.113 If an independent invention defense is 
introduced in patent law, defendant companies would limit their contact with 
patent holders, and would limit the information its researchers have access 
to, in order to increase the chances that, should an infringement occur, the 
independent invention defense would apply.114 By contrast, under strict 
liability, the defendant’s liability does not depend on their level of 
knowledge, and thus companies have less incentive to keep their researchers 
in the dark about existing patents.115  
 Lastly, some commentators have suggested introducing compulsory 
licensing regime in cases of accidental patent infringement. For example, 
Lemley and Weiser argues that in cases where transaction costs significantly 
reduce the ability of the patentee and the technology user from bargaining for 
a license, a “liability rule” ought to be implemented, i.e. an obligation to pay 
damages, rather than a “property rule”, i.e. an obligation to stop using the 
technology until receiving the owner’s permission.116 This proposal would 
cover accident cases wherein the technology owner and the patentee often 
cannot bargain ex ante. What the authors do not question is what type of 
liability rule ought to be in place: strict liability or negligence? This article 
agrees that a property rule ought to give way to a liability rule. But a 
compulsory licensing regime, where damages must be paid upon every 
accidental infringement, is a version of a strict liability regime. Part III 
considers whether the duty to pay damages ought not be so strictly imposed, 
but instead only awarded where the defendant failed to take reasonable care 
to prevent the infringement. 
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2. Independent Invention Proposals 
 On the other end of the spectrum, some commentators argue that 
patent law should adopt an “independent invention” defense, i.e. a defense 
for making, using or selling patented technology when the user has 
independently recreated the technology, rather than copying it from an 
existing technology. In 2002, Maurer and Scotchmer proposed that such a 
defense would be beneficial for social welfare.117 The authors posited that 
two positive consequences would occur, should such a defense be introduced. 
First, the authors found that the threat of entry by independent invention 
would encourage patent holders to license patented technology more 
frequently and at lower prices, thus increasing access to the technology.118 In 
a system with an independent invention defense, it would make financial 
sense for the patentee to deter market entry by an independent inventor 
through licensing the technology at a price below the price set in a legal 
regime without an independent invention defense. The authors argue that 
while the patentee would receive a lower profit, his licensing revenue would 
still exceed the amount necessary to cover R&D costs. Second, the authors 
posit that such a doctrine would limit the amount of investment into patent 
“races.”119   
 The common counter-argument to any proposal to adopt an 
independent invention defense is that such a doctrine would negatively affect 
inventors’ incentives to create. This was partially a concern raised in the 
original Maurer and Scotchmer article.120 The Maurer-Scotchmer proposals 
were based on a model of innovation wherein the costs of research and 
development was relatively low.121 If this assumption is relaxed, and cases 
where R&D costs are particularly high (e.g. such as pharmaceutical research 
where ex ante probability of success of producing a patentable invention are 
low) then the authors found that an independent invention defense could 
indeed undercut incentives to invent. To avoid this problem, Maurer and 
Scotchmer suggest adopting a series of statutory exemptions to the 
independent invention defense.122 But this raises the problem, as stated by 
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Blair and Cotter, that it leads to rent seeking as certain industries lobby to be 
qualified as an exempted industry.123  
Subsequent commentators have debated whether such a doctrine 
would diminish inventors’ profits too greatly. In 2006, Samson Vermont 
offered a novel argument in favor of an independent invention defense.124  
While acknowledging that such a defense would limit patent holder profits, 
Vermont concluded that the reduction in expected profit is likely to have only 
a moderate effect on incentives to invent.125  Vermont argues that many 
inventions are created by more than one person in quick succession (and this 
is particularly true of highly socially valuable inventions, for example, the 
lightbulb by Edison and Swann, or the telephone by Bell and Gray).126 
Vermont argues the fact that an invention could be invented by multiple 
people is evidence that a moderate reduction in profits, such as that which 
would come from allowing an independent invention defense, is unlikely to 
harm incentives to create; it is likely that the reduced profits will be enough 
to motivate at least one inventor to create the invention. However, some 
commentators are not convinced by this argument. While acknowledging the 
reasoning, Mark Lemley responds that the “stakes are quite high” and that, if 
an independent invention defense would significantly reduce the incentives 
to innovate, then “the potential losses for society are substantial”, and this is 
particularly relevant in the class of high social utility inventions that Vermont 
discusses.127 Lemley concludes that he is “not yet confident that an 
independent invention defense will have no undue effect on incentives.”128 
Nevertheless, the merits of an independent invention defense largely 
fall outside the scope of this article’s concern. First, an independent invention 
defense does more than shield the accidental infringer from liability, but has 
the ability to protect an intentional infringer as well. Consider for example 
someone who independently invents a patented technology. After which, she 
is informed of the patent. Any subsequent selling of the technology would be 
an intentional infringement. However, the independent invention defense 
would shield her from liability flowing from subsequent sales performed with 
knowledge of the patent. Second, an independent invention defense does not 
necessarily mean the underlying liability rule is not strict. Copyright law 
adopts an independent creation defense, yet the liability rule in copyright law 
is routinely described as strict because “copying” is not necessarily 
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understood as requiring deliberate and intentional action.129 These two points 
indicate there may be some divergence between the question of whether an 
independent invention defense is appropriate, and the question of whether a 
fault standard is desirable.  
Fundamentally, the independent defense question and the fault 
question are distinct and ought not to be confused.  When debating the merits 
of an independent invention defense, scholars are trying to determine what 
conduct should fall within the scope of the patent monopoly? Should uses of 
the good following independent invention fall within the IP owner’s 
exclusive right or not? The answer to which will depend on a careful 
balancing of the incentive benefits and access costs of extending the scope of 
the monopoly. This is different from the question posed when considering 
strict liability versus negligence. Here the question is: Assuming the 
defendant has performed some conduct that falls within the scope of the 
patent monopoly, should the defendant nevertheless be exempted from 
liability on the grounds that they took reasonable care to prevent such conduct 
from occurring? Because these questions are different, the paradigm we use 
to answer these questions is also different. The analytical framework required 
to answer the fault question is distinct from a simple incentive-access cost 
analysis. Rather, we assume the incentive-access paradigm has been 
considered, and that the scope of the patent monopoly is set according to that 
paradigm, and then move on to a distinct, but equally important, policy 
question: How can we most cheaply reduce the costs of such infringement 
occurring? This analytical framework will be applied to our problem in Part 
III. As a result, the Article focuses squarely on the choice between strict 
liability and negligence liability for infringements of patent rights, and leaves 
the question of an independent invention defense for another day.  
3. Negligence Proposals 
 Relatively few commentators have explicitly explored the use of 
negligence liability in patent law. However, there has been some recent 
thought in this direction. In 2012, Sterk suggested that property law in 
general, and intellectual property law in specific, should adopt negligence 
rules more frequently.130 Indeed, Sterk highlighted that, contrary to common 
wisdom, property law often relies on negligence rules (or “proxies” for 
negligence rules) in certain circumstances.131 These rules apply often “where 
 
129 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 
1963); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
130 Stewart E. Sterk, Strict Liability and Negligence in Property Theory, 160 PA. L. REV. 
2129 (2012). 
131 Id. at 2141-50. 
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ascertaining the scope of boundaries is costly.”132 Sterk cites “reasonable 
encroachers” as an example: where a defendant inadvertently builds on the 
land of another after commissioning a survey to determine the precise 
boundary between the land, courts will often use doctrines such as “relative 
hardship” to defeat any claim brought on behalf of the property owner.133 
Sterk argues that courts recognize that, in such circumstances, the defendant 
has taken reasonable care to avoid the infringement, and proxy rules are 
applied to excuse the infringement.134 By contrast, if a defendant builds on a 
neighbor’s land in direct contrast to the survey’s conclusions, courts typically 
require the defendant to remove the encroachment.135  
 Nevertheless, Sterk’s article, while presenting a novel and interesting 
argument, is incomplete in some important respects. Most importantly, the 
analytical-theoretical framework used to decide whether a negligence rule 
ought to be imposed could be improved. Sterk accurately highlights how it is 
costly to discern the existence and scope of IP rights.136 But that itself does 
not explain why a negligence rule, as opposed to a strict liability rule, is 
appropriate.137 There is a justificatory “gap” in the paper. To fill in this gap, 
we require a more defined and robust normative framework in place before 
we can answer these questions fully. Part III of this article supplies and 
applies that analytical-normative framework.  
 In a similar vein, Tun-Jen Chiang recommends that patent law, in 
theory, should adopt a “contributory search” defense to infringement actions 
(akin to a contributory negligence defence).138 While patent doctrine typically 
expects producers to search for patentees, Chiang argues that, in some 
 
132 Id. at 2133.  
133 Id. at 2143. 
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Sterk’s article does make some moves to justify the use of negligence rules by 
appealing to the concept of information costs. However, information cost theory is more 
helpful when determining how to define property rights, than on the question of fault. As 
discussed in the work of Henry Smith, property rights can be delineated using either 
exclusion or governance strategies, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two 
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL. STUD. S453 (2002). The choice of 
an exclusion strategy or a governance stagey ought to be made by comparing the benefit that 
more precisely delineated property rights would provide against the cost of acquiring the 
extra additional information required to delineate such rights. Once property rights are so 
defined, there is a separate question, discussed in this article, i.e. whether all infringements 
of those rights should result in liability, or only those infringements which result from 
carelessness. As Part III elaborates upon, this decision must be made by examining the 
effects of the possible liability rules on the parties’ incentives to invest efficient levels of 
resources in accident avoidance.  
138 Supra note 11. Although practical difficulties in doing so leads Chiang to ultimately 
adopt a more modest proposal of amending the current damages framework, id. at 43-50. 
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circumstances, it is in fact easier for patentees to search for producers.139  
Consider for example, the Rambus case discussed earlier.140 As Rambus was 
aware of the patent and the potential for infringement, it was easier for 
Rambus to alert Infineon to the presence of the patent claims than it was for 
Infineon to discover Rambus’s entitlements.141 Likewise, in some industries, 
such as the smartphone industry, where there are many patentees but 
relatively few producers, it may also be easier for the patentees to keep track 
of the use of their proprietary technology than require producers to clear all 
patents.142 To reduce the chances of inadvertent infringement, Chiang argues 
that patent law needs some doctrinal mechanism to encourage the least cost 
searcher – whether that is patentee or producer – to conduct appropriate 
searches. The tool for the job is, theoretically, a contributory search (or 
contributory negligence) defense. Inadvertent infringers ought to be able to 
avoid liability if they can show that in fact the patentee was best placed to 
avoid the infringement. By introducing such a defence, companies like 
Rambus would no longer benefit from hiding their patent claims, and thus the 
chances of inadvertent infringement would be minimized.  
 Nevertheless, questions remain post Chiang’s article. Like Sterk’s 
article, there is the question of which type of negligence rule is preferable? 
Why, for example, is a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory 
negligence defense preferable when a simple negligence rule (or indeed a 
comparative negligence rule) would be equally capable of encouraging the 
producer search? Furthermore, neither Sterk nor Chiang directly address a 
number of “secondary considerations” which need to be considered before 
proposing some form of negligence rule. These include, for example, the 
administrative cost of such a rule and the likelihood of judicial errors. 
Similarly, Chiang’s article is also somewhat limited in scope. The article is 
focused primarily on encouraging patent holders to search for technology 
users.143 However, there are arguably other ways that the patent holder could 
prevent accidents, outside of searching for technology users, such as by fixing 
appropriate notice to the work or by writing clearer patent claims. Ideally, the 
question of strict liability versus negligence should consider whether the 
chosen liability rule encourages the patent holder to take these other 
 
139 Id.  
140 Rambus, Inc. v Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F. 3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert denied, 124 
S.Ct. 227 (2003). 
141 Id. at 12-13. 
142 Id. at 4 (“if there are a small number of well-known producers (e.g. a few large 
companies that dominate an industry), while there are thousands of small and unknown 
patentees, then it would be more efficient to have patentees look for producers, rather than 
have producers look for patentees.”) 
143 Id. 
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important precautionary measures as well.144 Lastly, as will be elaborated 
upon in Part III, this Article employs a slightly different, but arguably more 
standard, set of theoretical models to analyze the problem.145 
 What is needed at this stage is a more analytical approach to the 
question of strict liability versus negligence in patent law. While Sterk’s and 
Chiang’s research provides important insights, this present Article builds on 
their work by providing a less synthetic approach (that focuses on 
highlighting similarities with tort law), and a more analytical dissection of 
the costs and benefits associated with a negligence rule in patent law. It is to 
that analysis that the Article now turns.  
 III.  THE CASE FOR NEGLIGENCE 
The primary justification for patent rights is utilitarian: patent rights 
are desirable to the extent they maximize the common good.146 In this Article, 
it is assumed that an efficient use of resources will maximize society’s 
welfare and thus contribute to the common good. But what liability rule will 
result in an efficient use of resources? Using economic models of accidents 
from the law of torts, Section A begins by fleshing out the concept of welfare 
maximization in this context. Contrary to common belief, society’s welfare 
will not be best served by attempting to stop all accidental infringements. 
Instead, the goal for policymakers should be to encourage parties to take cost-
justified measures to avoid accidental infringement. Section B and C compare 
various liability rules in relation to this goal. Section D concludes that some 
form of a negligence liability rule is optimal because a negligence rule 
incentivizes cost-justified accident prevention from all relevant parties. This 
Part finds that the best liability rule is either a simple negligence rule or a 
strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense, and 
explains some further reasons for preferring a simple negligence rule. 
A.  The Social Cost of Patent Accidents 
 Accidental infringement of patents harms society. However, 
spending time and resources on preventing accidental infringement is also 
harmful. Therefore, maximizing the common good requires members of 
 
144 See also Oskar Liivak, Negligent Innovation, (forthcoming) (similarly arguing that 
accidental patent infringement is a bilateral accident wherein incentives need to be set for 
both parties to take adequate precautionary measures).  
145 In particular, this Article departs from the ‘Least Cost Avoider’ model. See infra note 
156. 
146 See e.g. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 326, 334-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed. 1903) (society ought 
only suffer the “embarrassment of an exclusive patent” if it “benefits society”) cited in 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1966).  
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society to minimize the aggregate harm (hereinafter “cost”) flowing from 
these two sources. This Section explains each of these points in turn. 
1. Accident Costs 
Inventions are almost universally beneficial for society but, due to a 
public-goods market failure, are likely to be under-produced in a competitive 
market.147 Patent rights redress this issue by providing a time-limited 
monopoly right. During the patent term, anyone who wishes to use the 
invention must negotiate a license with the patent holder, and pay the inventor 
a supra-competitive price. The ability to charge a supra-competitive price 
enables the inventor to recover the fixed research and development costs of 
the invention, and thus encourages inventors to supply inventions at a more 
socially optimal rate.  
Accidental infringement of patents hampers this goal. In accident 
cases, it is impossible for the technology user to negotiate a license ex ante 
because, at this point in time, it is not clear whether the technology is patented 
or who the patent holder is. As a result, accidental infringement of patents 
occurs, resulting in the patentee’s invention being used without the patentee 
receiving compensation. This lost revenue represents a private cost to the 
patentee. More importantly, the lost revenue of the patentee may reduce 
innovation incentives for future inventors, resulting in a social cost to the 
wider public at a later time. For the time being, we shall assume that the 
private cost the patentee suffers in lost license fees is a decent proxy for the 
lost future social welfare resulting from decreased innovation incentives.   
Let us call the private cost imposed on the patentee the accident costs 
or A, and further let us assume that if the accident costs are, e.g. $100, that 
this will reduce incentives for future innovation also by $100. Prior to the 
accident occurring, the technology user cannot say with certainty what the 
accident costs will be, but she can roughly calculate the expected accident 
Costs or pA by multiplying the probability of an accident occurring (p) by the 
amount of private harm (A) that such an accident would cause if it were to 
occur.   
2. Precaution Costs 
 The technology user can take steps to prevent such accidental 
infringement occurring. Assuming the parties are operating in a country 
which has publicly accessible register of all granted patents, someone 
engaging in a technical activity can search the register to determine whether 
her activity would infringe a valid patent. Such users can also inspect any 
relevant physical products to see whether they are labeled with patent 
 
147 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-334 (2003). 
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information (e.g. a patent number). Furthermore, users can keep up to date 
with the patent portfolios of competitors and perform other searches (such as 
simple Google searches). Let us call this user care or Cu.  
Equally, the patent holder can also take care to prevent such accidents. 
Most importantly, the patent holder can mark any products she produces with 
the relevant patent information148 (including products which are not 
themselves patented, but which are produced by a patented method149). This 
traditionally has required physical marking of patented products, but since 
the America Invents Acts, the patentee’s ability to provide notice through 
marking has substantially increased via the use of “virtual marking” i.e. 
affixing onto articles the word “patent” (or “pat”) followed by a URL address 
directing the user to a website containing patented information.150 Likewise, 
patent holders can maintain websites providing “standardized information 
about all intellectual property rights associated with protected products”151 
and update those websites as new IPRs are acquired. The patent holder can 
also write clearer patent claims, thus increasing the chances that a user 
searching the registry will find the relevant patent information. Or, as argued 
by Chiang, patent holders can also search for users. In some markets where 
there are many patentees but only a few users of the technology (e.g. the semi-
conductor industry where there are many patentees but only a handful of 
producers), then it may be relatively easy for the patentee to locate producers 
and initiate negotiations.152 In some cases, particularly where unwary 
consumers may be involved, the patentee can effectively “spread the word” 
(as George Selden did) about the hazards created by upstream unlawful uses 
of their works.153 While it certainly conceivable that in some cases, the 
patentee does not have any truly reasonable precautionary measures available 
to her, this is not true of the majority of cases. In most cases, the probability 
of a patent accident is determined not simply by the actions of the technology 
 
148 See e.g. Claire Curran, A Simple Guide to Marking Your IP Rights, UDL INTEL. PROP. 
(May 21, 2018).  
149 See Christine Sharkey, Strategic Assertions: Evading the Patent Marking 
Requirement, 12 NW. J. TECH. & IP 103 (2014). 
150 See generally United States Patent and Trademark Office, Report on Virtual Marking 
(2014). See also Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Notice Failure Revisited: Evidence on the use of 
Virtual Patent Marking, NBER Working Paper No. 242888 (Feb. 2018). It is questionable 
whether the marking requirements currently provide adequate incentives to innovators to 
mark, see Menell and Meurer, supra note 86 at 37 (“both patent and copyright law have 
weakened marking requirements over the past several decades as well as penalties for failure 
to provide accurate notice information.”) 
151 Menell and Meurer, supra note 85, at 37. Menell and Meurer consider the possibility 
of Congress mandating this precautionary measure from all companies. 
152 Supra note 142.  
153 Supra note 41. 
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user, but also by the actions of the patentee. Let us call this patentee care or 
Cp 
It is often underappreciated that taking these measures are themselves 
costly: it costs the technology user resources to search the register; it costs 
the patentee resources to appropriately mark products. Let us call this cost 
the prevention costs or B (i.e. the parties select a level of care, C, thus 
imposing a level of cost, B). Let us call the technology user’s prevention costs 
Bu and the patentee’s prevention costs Bp.  
3. Minimizing the Total Costs 
If the user takes care, C, the probability of an accident goes down, and 
so too does expected accident costs, pA. Thus, care has a positive effect on 
society’s welfare. Simultaneously however, as the level of care rises, so too 
does the prevention costs, B. As a result, taking more care, or trying to prevent 
all accidental infringements, is not necessarily the best social outcome. In 
order to minimize the total cost society loses on accidental infringement, the 
user must select a level of care that results in the least overall cost, taking into 
account both the probable accident costs and the prevention costs.154 As a 
rule of thumb, it is safe to say that in most cases taking some care will help 
reduce total cost, but that beyond a point, taking more care becomes wasteful 
and has a negative effect on society’s purse.  
As an analogy, consider road traffic accidents. If motorists drive 
slower, that will reduce the probability of accidents and thus their cost. But, 
this reasoning would not justify a complete ban on driving; clearly, if we were 
to ban driving completely society would be worse off. As Guido Calabresi 
famously pointed out in 1970, if we were to ban driving, the precautionary 
measure used to avoid the accidents would impose more cost on society than 
 
154 Arguably the cost of patent accidents involves an additional cost, i.e. the cost of 
duplicative R&D efforts. The social cost of the patent accident is not merely the cost to the 
patentee and the subsequent depression of innovation incentives, but also includes the 
resources society spends on recreating a technology which is already exists. See generally 
WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 302 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2003). However, for a number of reasons, the Article 
brackets this potential cost. It is not clear whether the majority of accidental infringement 
cases involve any significant duplication costs. For example, the Schmeiser case, discussed 
supra note 75, the Innovatio cases, discussed supra note 43, or the Rambus case, discussed 
supra note 48, did not involve any wasteful duplication efforts on behalf of the technology 
user. Furthermore, when some duplication is involved, such as in NTP v RIM, the second-
comer’s R&D can equally lead to benefits in terms of slightly differentiated products with 
the capacity to better supply consumer demand, see generally Christopher S. Yoo, 
Intellectual Property and the Economics of Product Differentiation, in 1 Research Handbook 
on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law (Ben Depoorter & Peter Menell eds., Edward 
Elgar 2018). As a result, it is difficult to say to what extent duplicative efforts exist and 
impose cost on the patent system. As a result, how these costs factor into the basic analysis 
is left to another day. 
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simply allowing the accidents to occur.155 To put it bluntly, we accept that 
some level of road traffic accidents will occur because it would be too costly 
to prevent it happening.  
The same is true in patent law today. If technology users take some 
level of care, e.g. by searching the patent register, that will often reduce the 
chances of an accident occurring and help lower total accident costs. But that 
is only true up to a point. At a certain point, the reverse is true and the costs 
of preventing the patent infringement outweigh the benefit it produces. For 
example, it would obviously be negative for society if all inventors were 
required to “down tools” and stop inventing whenever there was a risk that 
such technical activity would infringe a patent. Therefore, our goal ought not 
to be the complete eradication of patent accidents altogether. Instead, the 
optimal situation is for users to adopt a reasonable (i.e. cost-justified) level 
of care. More formally, the user ought to take care up to the point that when 
the marginal cost of such care equals the marginal benefit represented by the 
reduction in expected  accident cost; the user ought not to go beyond that 
point.   
Table 1 illustrates this principle. Consider a hypothetical situation in 
which only the technology user can take care to prevent the patent accident 
occurring. For example, the technology user has invented a new type of 
mousetrap and is considering whether to commercially sell this product. But 
she is concerned that the mousetrap may already be patented. If she does not 
compensate the patentee for use of the mousetrap, the patentee will suffer a 
private cost of $100. At this point, she has three options: she could not search 
the patent register, she could spend 1 hour searching the register, or she could 
spend 2 hours searching the register. The probability of accident plus the 
costs associated with the level of care are depicted in the table.  
 
Table 1: User Care 
 Cost of 
Care 
Probability of 
Accident 
Expected 
Accident 
Loss 
Total 
Social Cost 
0 Hour 
Search 
0 15% 15 15 
1 Hour 
Search 
3 10% 10 13 
2 Hour 
Search 
6 8% 8 14 
 
 
155 Calabresi, supra note 24.   
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In this scenario, total social cost is minimized if the user spends 1 hour 
searching the register for the patentee. Spending 1 hour searching is cost-
justified because while it imposes a marginal cost of $3, it produces a 
marginal benefit of $5 (i.e. the expected accident costs reduce by $5). 
However, spending a second hour searching is not cost-justified. A second 
hour searching imposes a marginal cost of $3 but only produces a marginal 
benefit of $2. Thus, social cost is minimized if, and only if, the user takes 
cost-justified care.  
 In most real-world situations, both the technology user and the 
patentee can take some cost-justified precautions to avoid the accident. 
Minimizing the total social cost of patent accidents often requires the 
technology user to perform a patent register search, but also requires the 
patent holder to provide appropriate notice of the patent rights by drafting 
clear claims, by marking the product in an accessible manner, and by 
searching for technology users. Table 2 illustrates this intuition. Consider 
once again the technology user that is considering whether to sell her 
mousetrap, and has the option to spend between 0 and 2 hours searching the 
patent register. Further, imagine that the patentee also has the ability to take 
care at the same cost: the patentee also can spend between 0 and 2 hours 
searching for potential users of her patented mousetrap. These “care options” 
are laid out below. 
In a case such as this, the optimal situation is e: both parties take 1 
hour care. As in the previous table, the cost-justified level of precaution for 
the user is to 1 hour care. Any less care (options a-c) or any more care (option 
g-i) would result in higher social cost. Likewise, it is also cost-justified for 
the patentee to spend 1 hour searching: the marginal benefit of $4 in reduced 
expected accident costs exceeds the marginal cost it imposes of $3. However, 
spending the second hour searching is not cost justified because the marginal 
cost it imposes outweighs the reduction in expected accident costs.  
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Table 2: User Care and Patentee Care 
 User 
Care 
(Hours 
Search) 
Patentee 
Care 
(Hours 
Search) 
User 
Care 
Cost 
Patentee 
Care Cost 
Probability 
of Accident 
Expected 
Accident 
Costs 
Total 
Social 
Cost 
a. 0 0 0 0 15% 15 15 
b. 0 1 0 3 11% 11 14 
c. 0 2 0 6 10% 10 16 
d. 1 0 3 0 10% 10 13 
e. 1 1 3 3 6% 6 12 
f. 1 2 3 6 5% 5 14 
g. 2 0 6 0 8% 8 14 
h. 2 1 6 3 5% 5 14 
i. 2 2 6 6 5% 5 17 
 
The table illustrates another important principle: minimizing the total 
social cost of patent accidents cannot be achieved by simply identifying the 
“least cost avoider.”156 Sometimes the argument is made that generally the 
 
156 Commonly, a least cost-avoider (LCA) model is used to allocate responsibility in 
unilateral rather than bilateral accidents. In patent law, accidents are bilateral because both 
parties can affect the probability of an accident. But what if only one party can take efficient 
precautionary measures? Or alternatively, what if both parties can take care, but because 
their care would be largely duplicative, it is better if only one party take care? In these cases, 
law and economics literature often recommends identifying the party which could avoid the 
accident at the least cost and allocate the responsibility wholly to that party, see SHAVELL, 
supra note 00, at 18 (“[B]oth injurers and victims generally ought to do something to avoid 
risk; the effect of liability rules is therefore different from that in the least-cost avoider 
model.”).  
This version of the LCA analysis ought not to be confused with the LCA analysis 
provided in Chiang, supra note 11. Chiang argues that patent law ought to place the burden 
on the party that can avoid the accident at the least cost. However, Chiang’s analysis is more 
sophisticated than most common versions of the LCA discussed in patent law. Chiang’s LCA 
analysis is a marginal analysis. That is, the law will impose the responsibility on the LCA, 
but it will do so ex post. Parties will not know until litigation who is the LCA. The court will 
then compare the parties’ relative search costs and then determine the LCA. As a result, the 
parties will not know in advance which party is the LCA, and this will give them the incentive 
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user can take more effective measures to prevent the accident than the 
patentee, and therefore the responsibility should wholly fall on that user to 
avoid the accident.157 But while often true, this criticism is beside the point. 
Even if the user has generally more effective measures than the patentee, the 
patentee may still have some cost-justified precautionary measures which, if 
taken, would further reduce the accident costs. The goal should be to 
encourage all parties who can take non-duplicative cost-effective care to do 
so, rather than simply set incentives for one party. 
 The table demonstrates this claim. In the scenario, the user has the 
more effective precautionary measures: in option d, the user takes one hour 
care reducing the probability of the accident by 5%, whereas in option b, the 
patentee takes one hour care thus reducing the accident probability by 4%. 
Therefore, if the choice is to make either the user or the patentee take 1 hour 
care, then making the user take care is preferable because it results in less 
cost (i.e. $13 instead of $14). However, these two options are both less 
preferable to the optimal situation, option e, wherein both parties take 1 hour 
care: this option reduces cost to $12. This situation occurs because user care 
and patentee care often have a synergetic effect: the effect of the 
precautionary measures are not simply cumulative, but have an effect greater 
than the sum of its parts.  
 
to both parties to conduct reasonable cost-justified searches ahead of time. A patentee, for 
example, will not know whether she is will be held the LCA, and accordingly will perceive 
a risk that she will be held to be the LCA and thus contributorily negligent if she fails to 
perform a reasonable search. As a result, Chiang’s proposal is appropriate to a bilateral 
accident model.  
As a result, Chiang’s analysis aims to set incentives for bilateral care just as the analysis 
in this Article. Nevertheless, some questions linger about the marginal LCA analysis. Most 
importantly, I find the analysis a little convoluted. Standard accounts of accidents typically 
split accidents into unilateral and bilateral accidents: in the former, economists suggest that 
the law should allocate the responsibility for avoiding the accident to the LCA, whereas in 
the lateral, economists suggest the law should allocate the responsibility using a negligence 
rule, see SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 18. I worry that transporting the LCA concept into the 
bilateral accident arena makes matters more confusing than it needs to be and accordingly 
invites misunderstandings (See Shavell, supra note at 34 at 18 (“The model of least-cost 
avoider may be misleading for thinking about the class of bilateral accidents examined in 
this book.”). Chiang clearly tries to prevent those misunderstandings in the article, but the 
nuances of this analysis may very well be missed by even reasonably alert readers. Secondly, 
I am not entirely convinced that if a court were to determine the LCA ex post, this would 
always lead to adequate incentives for bilateral care ex ante. For example, imagine the user 
finds a product that she suspects is patented, but which has no patent marking. The user may 
accurately predict that a court in such circumstances would hold the patentee to be the LCA, 
on the grounds that adequate patent marking is lacking. The user may still be able to take 
some reasonable measures in this case, such as performing a search of the registry. However, 
knowing in advance the likelihood that the patentee would be deemed the LCA, would the 
user still adopt these reasonable measures?   
157 See Chiang, supra note 11 at 10-14 (summarizing versions of this view). 
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Now that we understand our goal (i.e. that both users and patentees 
should take cost-justified measures to avoid the accident), the question 
becomes: What liability rule ought we impose to achieve this outcome? What 
liability rule would help achieve this end? Subsequent to Calabresi, legal 
economists have analyzed when, and in what circumstances, different 
liability rules help minimize accident costs (most notably, Shavell,158 Landes 
& Posner,159 and Cooter & Ulen160). The following Sections apply the 
analytical frameworks and insights developed in this literature to the 
particular problem of minimizing the cost of patent accidents.  
B.  Liability Rules Compared: Primary Considerations 
Having demonstrated that efficient use of resources requires the 
patentee and the user to take cost-justified preventative measures, the 
question we must answer next is: Which liability rule will encourage the 
parties to take such care? This Section compares various liability rules in 
relation to this goal. The following section introduces some further variables 
(or “secondary considerations”) into the analysis.  
1. No Liability 
Under a no liability rule, the user is not liable for the accidents she 
causes. Therefore, the accident costs remain with the patentee. Thus, the 
patentee pays for the costs of her precaution and the expected accident costs 
(i.e. Bp + pA). Meanwhile, the user only pays the costs of her precautions (Bu). 
Both patentee and user are assumed to be rational actors who will select a 
level of care (C) to minimize their own private cost.  
Using our mousetrap example from earlier, Table 3 demonstrates the 
private costs that the parties would bear under various different liability rules. 
The care options in Table 3 mimic those found in Table 2. From this table, 
we can see that under a no liability rule, the parties will not select the optimal 
levels of care, i.e. option e.  While the patentee will take the appropriate care, 
the technology user will not.161 As the technology user is still liable for willful 
infringement, the patentee’s best financial strategy is to alert the user to the 
 
158 Supra note 34. 
159 RICHARD POSNER & WILLIAM M. LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
(1987) 
160 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (2016). 
161 This is, of course, a highly stylized analysis. In reality, a range of other doctrinal 
mechanisms (see e.g. 35 USC 112 definiteness requirement) and practical realities encourage 
some patentee care. However, the preceding discussion reveals that these instruments alone 
lead to sub-optimal incentives as evidenced by the high rate of accidental infringement. 
Therefore, this analysis strips those considerations away to first establish what liability rule 
is appropriate, and then later in Part IV analyzes some of the doctrines already in place to 
encourage such care.  
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patent, thus improve the chances of a licensing deal. On the other hand, in 
order to minimize her private costs, the technology user will select to spend 
0 hours searching, i.e. options a-c. From these options, the patentee will select 
to spend 1 hour searching because this minimizes her private expenditure (i.e. 
she spends $14 rather than $15 or $16). Therefore, the equilibrium is that the 
parties will select option b and total social cost will be higher than optimal 
(e).  
2. Strict Liability 
Under a strict liability rule, the user must pay the patentee 
compensatory damages, or a liability award, L, which is equal to the accident 
costs. Therefore, the patentee only bears the cost of her own precaution (Bp), 
while the technology user pays the costs of her precaution and the expected 
liability award (i.e. Bu + pL). Once again, both parties select a level of care 
that will minimize these costs. The parties’ private costs associated with this 
liability rule are found above in Table 3.   
This rule will once again result in sub-optimal behavior. The patentee 
will minimize her costs by selecting 0 hours search, i.e. options a, d, or g. 
Meanwhile, the defendant will select to perform 1 hour search because this 
minimizes her cost (she pays $13 rather than $14 or $15). The resulting in 
equilibrium is option d and total social cost is higher than optimal. 
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Table 3: Private Cost Under Liability Rules 
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3. Negligence 
In contrast to strict liability and no liability, this Section demonstrates 
that a negligence rule would encourage cost-justified care from both parties. 
A liability rule is a categorized as a negligence rule if the decision to impose 
liability is conditional upon one or more party’s level of preventative care 
falling below an acceptable level.162 There are multiple different forms such 
a negligence rule could take: simple negligence, strict liability plus a 
contributory negligence defense, negligence plus a contributory negligence 
defense, or comparative negligence; each one provides incentives for bilateral 
cost-justified care.163  
Under a simple negligence rule, the technology user pays 
compensatory damages if she fails to take all reasonable care.164 Care is 
considered “reasonable” if it is cost-justified (this is the famous Learned 
Hand formula where care is considered reasonable if the marginal benefit it 
produces is greater than the marginal cost it imposes).165 Therefore, if a 
technology user fails to take all reasonable care, she will pay a liability award 
plus any care she does take (i.e.  Bu + pL); meanwhile, the patentee in this 
situation will only pay for her own precaution costs (i.e. Bp). Alternatively, if 
a technology user does take all reasonable care, she will only pay for the cost 
of her care (i.e. Bu); meanwhile, the patentee will pay for her care and any 
remaining expected accident costs (i.e. Bp + pA). The private costs the parties 
face under a negligence rule are above in Table 3.  Under this rule, a 
technology user will minimize her costs by selecting 1 hour search. Taking 
any care below this level exposes her to liability, while taking care above this 
level imposes extra prevention costs. Therefore, the technology user will 
select option d, e, or f. From these options, the patentee minimizes her costs 
by selecting 1 hour care. The equilibrium is that both parties take the 
appropriate level of care and social cost is minimized.  
Under a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence, the user is 
liable for all accidents she causes, unless the patentee is contributorily 
negligent.166 If the patentee is contributorily negligent, the user is not liable. 
A defendant is contributorily negligent if she failed to take all reasonable care 
to prevent the accident. Once again, reasonable is equated with cost-justified 
precaution. Therefore, if the patentee takes reasonable care, then the patentee 
pays for her own care costs (Bp), while the technology user pays for her own 
 
162 See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 160, at 189-228. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 196.  
165 Id. at 205-08. 
166 Id. at 208-11.  
9-Sep-19] Indiana L. J. (forthcoming) 37 
care costs and expected liability (Bu + pL). If the patentee fails to take 
reasonable care, then the patentee pays for her own care plus any expected 
accident costs (Bp + pA), while the user pays for her care costs only (Bu). 
Table 3 lists the private costs the parties face under this rule. Under this rule, 
the patentee will select to perform 1 hour search (i.e. options b, e, or h) as 
this minimizes her costs (i.e. $3). From these options, the user will select 
option e as this minimizes her costs. The result is the parties’ select option e 
and total costs are minimized.  
Under a negligence rule with a contributory negligence defense, the 
user is liable for accidents caused by her negligence, unless the patentee was 
also negligent. Once again negligence is defined as failure to take reasonable 
care according to the Learned Hand Formula.167 Under this rule, the 
following options emerge: (1) if the user takes reasonable care, she bears the 
cost of her own precaution only (Bu); meanwhile the patentee bears the cost 
of her own precaution plus any remaining expected accident costs (i.e. Bp + 
pA); (2) if the user fails to take reasonable care, and the patentee takes 
reasonable care, then bears the cost of her own precaution and any expected 
liability costs (Bu + pL); meanwhile, the patentee pays for her own precaution 
costs (Bp); if the user fails to take reasonable care, and the patentee also fails 
to take reasonable care, then the user bears only her own precaution costs 
(Bu); meanwhile the patentee pays for her own precaution costs and any 
remaining expected accident costs (Bp + pA). Table 3 demonstrates the private 
costs associated with each liability rule. Under this rule, the patentee has an 
incentive to take cost-justified precaution. By searching for one hour, the 
patentee can minimize her own private costs (any less than this exposes her 
to the possibility of being held contributorily negligent and paying for the 
expected accident costs; any more than this is unnecessarily increases her 
precaution costs). If the patentee can be expected to search for one hour, then 
the options for the technology user are options b, e and h. To minimize her 
private costs she will select option e (any less exposes her to liability, any 
more than that is unnecessary to avoid liability). Once again, the optimal 
choice is reached.  
Lastly, under a comparative negligence rule, the user is not liable 
when she takes due care. If she fails to take due care, then she will be liable. 
However, if she fails to take due care, and the patentee also fails to take due 
care, then the court will apportion the accidents costs between the two parties 
according to their level of fault.168 Therefore, the following options emerge: 
 
167 Id. Note, this is distinct from the type of “contributory negligence” rule used in other 
common law systems, particularly the U.K. where “contributory negligence” refers to a 
reduction in damages proportional to the defendant’s fault, see Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945 §1 (UK). 
168 Id.  
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(1) If the user takes reasonable care, she bears the cost of her own precaution 
only (Bu); meanwhile the patentee bears the cost of her own precaution plus 
any remaining expected accident costs (i.e. Bp + pA); (2) if the user fails to 
take reasonable care, and the patentee takes reasonable care, then the user 
bears the cost of her own precaution and any expected liability costs (Bu + 
pL); meanwhile, the patentee pays for her own precaution costs (Bp) (3) if the 
user fails to take reasonable care, and the patentee also fails to take reasonable 
care, then the user bears her own precaution costs and a portion (assumed 
here to be half) of the accident costs in liability (Bu + pL/2); meanwhile, the 
patentee pays for her own precaution costs and any remaining expected 
accident costs (Bp + pA/2). Table 3 demonstrates the private costs associated 
with each liability rule. Under this rule, the technology user minimizes her 
own costs by taking one hour care (options d-f). Thereafter, the patentee 
minimizes her costs by selecting one hour care. The equilibrium is option e, 
and total cost is minimized.  
C.  Liability Rues Compared: Secondary Considerations 
Thus far, the analysis has demonstrated that all versions of a 
negligence rule are preferable to a strict liability rule or no liability. Because 
negligence rules encourage both technology user and patentee to take cost-
justified precautions, such rules help minimize total social cost. By selecting 
a level of care that conforms to the standard of reasonable care as defined by 
the Hand formula, each party has the ability to shift the accident costs onto 
the other party, thus minimizing their own private costs. This Section 
introduces further considerations that complicate the analysis, but that also 
help us select which version of a negligence rule is preferable. Those 
secondary considerations are: activity levels, administrate costs, error costs, 
and externalities.  
1. Activity Levels 
Taking more precaution is not the only way the parties can reduce the 
chances of an accident occurring. The other option is for the parties to change 
their activity levels.169 For example, in road traffic accident cases, drivers 
could reduce the possibility of an accident by not speaking on their cell 
phones while driving, but they could also reduce the probability of an 
accident simply by driving less. Likewise, in patent law, the technology user 
could reduce the probability of a patent accident by engaging in technical 
activities less often, and the patentee could also reduce the probability of an 
accident by reducing their level of innovation. However, the parties engage 
in these activities because doing so brings them utility. Therefore, while 
 
169 Id. at 211-13. 
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engaging in the activity less reduces the chances of harmful accidents, it also 
reduces the utility the parties receive. Table 4 illustrates this relationship.  
Table 4: Activity Levels 
 User 
Activity 
User 
Utility 
User 
Care 
Cost 
Ptee 
Activity 
Ptee 
Utility 
Ptee 
Care 
Cost 
Total 
Accident 
Losses 
Total 
Social 
Welfare 
1 1 40 3 1 40 3 20 54 
2 2 60 6 2 60 6 40 68 
3 3 69 9 3 69 9 60 60 
4 4 75 12 4 75 12 80 42 
5 5 70 15 5 70 15 100 10 
 
 Table 4 assumes that both the user and the patentee are now 
considering how much time to spend on the activity that may create patent 
accidents (i.e. innovation). Each party acts to maximize their own private 
utility. Total social welfare is calculated by adding the user utility and the 
patentee utility and subtracting the user care costs, the patentee care costs, 
and the total accident costs. Option 2 – both parties engage in the activity 2 
times – is optimal as this maximizes social welfare. Table 5 depicts the utility 
each party would receive under various different liability rules.  
 
Table 5: Activity Levels under Liability Rules 
 No Liability Strict Liability Simple 
Negligence 
Strict Liability + 
Contributory 
Negligence 
 User 
Utility 
Ptee 
Utility 
User 
Utility 
Ptee 
Utility 
User 
Utility 
Ptee 
Utility 
User 
Utility 
Ptee 
Utility 
1 40 17 17 40 37 17 17 37 
2 60 14 14 60 54 14 14 54 
3 69 0 0 69 60 0 0 60 
4 75 -21 -17 71 63 -21 -21 63 
5 70 -45 -45 70 55 -45 -45 55 
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 Under no liability, the user will engage in too much technical activity 
(in addition to not taking sufficient care), whereas the patentee will engage in 
the optimal amount of technical activity.170 The user maximizes her utility by 
simply selecting an option which yields the highest utility, i.e. option 4. 
Meanwhile, the patentee bears the cost of any care she takes and the expected 
accident costs. To maximize utility, the patentee sets an activity level that 
yields the highest utility minus the cost of care and the expected accident 
costs, i.e. option 2. Meanwhile, a strict liability rule yields the opposite 
conclusion. The user sets an activity level that maximizes her utility minus 
the cost of care and the expected accident costs, i.e. option 2, while the 
patentee selects an activity level that yields simply the highest utility, i.e. 
option 4.  
 More important, however, is the difference between the activity levels 
under a simple negligence rule and a strict liability rule with a contributory 
negligence defense. Under the simple negligence rule, the user will select an 
activity level that maximizes her utility minus the cost of care, i.e. option 4; 
the patentee meanwhile selects an activity level that maximizes her utility 
minus the cost of care and any remaining accident costs, i.e. option 2.171 
Therefore, the user engages in the activity too frequently, but the patentee 
does so at the optimal level. This is because the patentee is the residual bearer 
of the harm.172 Under a negligence rule, as demonstrated earlier, both parties 
will take cost-justified precautions. Nevertheless, there is still an expected 
accident cost when both take such precautions. The question is: Who bears 
this cost? In negligence, it is the patentee who bears this cost: as the user takes 
due care, she is not liable and the expected costs remain with the patentee. 
 Under a strict liability rule with contributory negligence, the opposite 
result is achieved because now the user and not the patentee is the residual 
bearer of the harm. Under this rule, the patentee will set her activity level that 
maximizes utility minus the cost of care. Meanwhile the user will set an 
activity level that maximizes her utility minus the cost of care and the 
expected accident costs.173 As a result, the user will engage in the activity at 
the optimal level, but the patentee does not. Likewise, under a negligence rule 
with contributory negligence, the patentee is the residual bearer of harm, 
therefore will take the appropriate activity level, but the user will not. The 
same is true for comparative negligence.  
 What this demonstrates is that no liability rule yields incentives for 
both bilateral care and optimal bilateral activity levels. Any form of 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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negligence rule will result in only one party internalizing the benefit of 
adopting an appropriate activity level, and as a result the other party will 
engage in the activity at too great an extent. The only theoretical exception to 
this would be if judges take activity levels into account when defining 
reasonable care under the Hand Formula. However, it is generally agreed that 
judges do not have the institutional ability to determine how much of an 
activity a private party ought to engage in (e.g. how many miles someone 
ought to drive their car). 
 The normal response to this by economists of tort law is to make the 
party whose activity is more likely to yield accidents the residual bearer of 
the harm.174 For example, accidents involving motors and bicycles involve 
bilateral care: cars can drive slower and with more observations, cyclists can 
wear appropriate colors and lights; it is optimal for both parties to take some 
level of care. However, the party who has the most control over the accident 
is likely the motorist – no amount of brightly colored vests will prevent the 
accident if the motorist drives with very little awareness of her surroundings. 
Ideally therefore, a strict liability + contributory negligence rule ought to be 
adopted. In which case, both motorists and cyclists will take an optimal care 
level, and because the motorist is the residual bearer of the harm, the motorist 
will select the appropriate activity level; the cyclist will not take the 
appropriate activity level and spend too much time cycling, but this is less 
dangerous than motorists spending extra hours on the road.  
 What does this mean for patent accidents? The answer is: surprisingly 
little! Having already established in section B that it is preferable to adopt 
some form of negligence rule to ensure bilateral care, the pressing question 
is: Which version of the negligence rule is preferable? However, we see that 
whatever version we choose will result in one party selecting an activity level 
that is higher than optimal. If a simple negligence rule is adopted, the user 
will engage in too much technical activity because she is not the residual 
bearer of harm (and the same for negligence + contributory negligence or 
comparative negligence); whereas if a strict liability rule with a contributory 
negligence defense is adopted the patentee will engage in too much technical 
activity. Therefore, we need to pick between the lesser of two evils: too much 
activity from the patentee or from the user.  
 The problem this presents is twofold. First, I am unconvinced that 
controlling the level of activity – innovation – is, as a practical matter, likely 
to improve social welfare. Innovations come with very significant positive 
externalities (or “spillovers”): new innovations spur future innovations in 
unpredictable and often very significant ways, and much of this value is not 
captured by the patentee.175 While the law of diminishing marginal utility 
 
174 Id. 
175 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 
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makes it clear that at some point investing in further innovation must become 
socially excessive, it seems unlikely that we are at such a point today. As a 
practical concern, the level of compound growth created by innovation 
suggests that the positive externalities associated with greater innovation will 
nearly always be greater than the social loss flowing from increased accident 
costs.176 Thus the “optimal” activity level seems of minor significance. 
However, put this concern to one side and assume that there is an 
optimal level of innovation that the parties ought to be engaging in from a 
welfare point. Even if we assume this, it is not clear that either party’s 
activities are more important to control in order to closer reach the social 
optimal. To decrease the expected accident costs, is it more important for the 
user to engage in less innovation, or is it more important for the patentee to 
engage in less innovation and to patent less frequently? I do not see a clear 
answer to this question. It seems initially that both parties’ activities have an 
equal effect on the probability of an accident occurring. While there certainly 
may be individual cases where one party’s activities may contribute greater 
to the chances of an accident, it is hard to say with any confidence whether 
globally, across the whole range of patent infringement, controlling the 
patentee’s or user’s activities is comparatively more important.177  
Therefore, the importance of activity levels ought to be largely 
bracketed when asking which is the optimal liability rule. To determine which 
is the best form of liability rule, we will need to spend more time focusing on 
the following criteria: administrative cost, error cost, and externalities.  
2. Administrative Cost 
Whatever rule is selected, actors in the legal system will need to apply 
the rule to real world cases. Different liability rules lead to greater or lesser 
amounts of such administrative costs.178 The cost of application depends on 
a number of factors, the most important of which are the complexity of the 
rules, and the number of cases requiring resolution.  
Strict liability is a relatively straight forward rule to apply, but it also 
leads to a high number of infringement cases.179 The rule is straightforward 
in application because, unlike negligence, the court is not required to conduct 
 
259 (2007).  
176 Robert Cooter, The Falcon’s Gyre: Legal Foundations of Economic Innovation and 
Growth (2014) (arguing that “innovation causes compound growth that swamps static 
inefficiency like a tsunami swamps a cow.”). 
177 This conclusion seems to stand even if the technology user is merely a non-innovative 
manufacturer/distributor. Society would not seem particularly well-served by trying to 
control the amount of products that are made and distributed any more than it would be by 
limiting the amount of innovation. 
178 See Cooter and Ulen, supra note 160, at 223-25. 
179 Id.  
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a complex factual inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
behavior.180 However, this initial cost saving is diminished because the strict 
liability rule results in more cases of infringement. Under a strict liability rule, 
nearly all cases of infringement will require some form of resolution. At its 
most costly that resolution will take the form of litigation and adjudication. 
But even cases which do not involve litigation will produce additional costs. 
In all cases of infringement, the patentee will attempt to shift the cost to the 
technology user, and this will involve procedure and associated costs. In the 
absence of litigation, that cost will come through alternative dispute 
resolution, inter-party negotiation, damage calculations, and transferring 
monetary compensation. By contrast, a negligence rule has the benefit of 
removing a subset of infringement cases and eliminating their associated 
resolution costs. Thus, a negligence rule has the benefit of reducing the 
amount of case resolution, although each case of infringement involves 
increased complexity.181   
Which would involve less administrative costs overall? It is difficult 
to say with confidence. The question depends on whether more frequent 
litigation, or more complex litigation, is a more significant contributor to the 
cost of the patent system. When comparing liability rules generally, strict 
liability is typically seen as the least administratively costly rule. On the other 
hand, existing empirical evidence suggests that the administrative costs of 
patent liability are currently very high, and this may be in part due to the 
current strict liability rule. Bessen and Meurer’s empirical analysis of the U.S. 
patent system found that patent litigation costs have “exploded” over past 
decades.182 The cost of the patent litigation annually for firms (excluding 
chemical and pharmaceutical firms) increased six-fold from 1984 to 1999 
(from less than $184 billion to $1,104 billion).183 What is driving this 
explosion? The authors conclude that the “increase in aggregate litigation 
cost is mainly driven by the increasing frequency of litigation, which has 
roughly tripled since the 1980s.”184  Litigation cost is exploding not only 
 
180 Furthermore, the rule is also easier to apply for individual parties. Currently under 
strict liability, patentees do not need to assess the technology user’s level of care prior to 
deciding to take action or not, whereas they would under a negligence rule. Under a 
negligence rule, not only would courts in litigation need to spend more resources on 
examining the defendant’s care, patentees would spend more resources on discovery and 
exploratory litigation to determine the defendant’s level of care. 
181 While negligence can increase the complexity of cases, it also has the potential to 
limit their complexity. In a subset of cases, it will be relatively easy for a court or fact finder 
to determine whether the defendant behaved negligently. In such cases, the decision maker 
can potentially determine the outcome of the case by examining the negligence issue only, 
without making a ruling on typically complicated matters such as claim construction. 
182 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 16. 
183 Id.  
184 Id.  
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because trials are becoming more complex and time consuming,185 but 
primarily because the volume of litigation is increasing. While ultimately, we 
do not have sufficient empirical evidence to fully determine the 
administrative costs of each liability rule, we can certainly say that a strict 
liability regime is not conclusively less administratively costly than a 
negligence liability rule.186  
Finally, it is worth noting that to the extent that a negligence rule is 
more complicated to apply, this cost is mitigated by the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Over time, courts applying a negligence standard will develop 
categories and clearer proxy rules for identifying negligence. This will aid in 
reducing the cost of applying the reasonableness test in future cases.  
3. Error Cost 
Courts are likely to make errors when applying the liability rule. In 
particular, courts may make errors when calculating the level of damages, or 
courts may make errors in defining the reasonable care standard.187 Both of 
these errors, if made consistently, could lead to the parties adopting sub-
optimal levels of care.  
A strict liability rule is highly prone to erroneous damage 
calculations. As demonstrated above in Table 3, a strict liability rule will 
incentivize the technology user to adopt an appropriate level of care. 
However, this assumes the liability award, L, is set equal to the accident costs. 
If the liability award is greater or less than the accident cost, A, then the user 
will take more or less than the optimal care level. Currently, under a strict 
liability rule, it is assumed that the patentee will take no care, and the user 
has a choice of taking 0 hours care, 1 hour care, or 2 hours care. One hour 
 
185 Although, that indeed is happening due to the increasing complexities of claim 
construction, see generally Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 572-92 (2013); Dan L. Burke & 
Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 
PENN L. REV. 1743 (2009). 
186 One potential counter-argument is that the increased uncertainty of a negligence rule 
will increase the amount of litigation, following the Priest-Klein hypothesis that win rates 
for plaintiffs tend towards 50 percent in cases where litigants have symmetric stakes, see 
George Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1984). However, to the extent that this is true, the effect must be balanced 
against the counter-veiling affect that the scope of infringement is decreased under 
negligence, that negligence sets better incentives for accident precaution, and that in many 
cases defendants will know in advance whether they have successfully adopted reasonable 
care thus limiting the uncertainty of the rule. When appreciated globally, it seems more likely 
that infringement cases will decrease under negligence, however the margin of such decrease 
will likely be smaller given the small potential for increased litigation flowing from 
uncertainty in the negligence rule.   
187 See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 160, at 217-20. 
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care is optimal, and because this option lowers the user’s costs (this option 
costs her $14 whereas option a costs $16 and option g costs $15), she will 
take this care. However, if the court erroneously calculates the damages and 
the liability award is double the actual damages, then the user has a choice of 
taking 0 hours care (for $30), 1 hour care (for $25), or two hours care (for 
$24). In this scenario, the user will take greater than optimal care because the 
liability award is much higher than the compensatory level. Therefore, while 
errors in judging reasonable care are impossible when applying a strict 
liability rule, errors in calculating damages are a significant challenge to 
setting the appropriate incentives for care.  
A simple negligence rule is the mirror image of a strict liability rule: 
while courts will make errors in applying the standard of care, errors in 
calculating damages are far less significant than in strict liability.188  Errors 
in applying the standard of care are highly significant. If the court sets the 
standard too high, technology users will over-invest in care. For example, in 
Table 3, imagine the court miscalculates the cost of the technology user’s 
patent search, and believes the cost of the second hour searching is only $1 
(not $3). Under the Hand formula, a court would find that a reasonable person 
would take this extra hour searching (because now the marginal benefit of $2 
in expected accident cost saved is greater than its marginal cost of $1).189 As 
a result, the user would have an incentive to conform to that higher standard, 
and take 2 hours care, to avoid a liability award, even though doing so 
deviates from the optimal care level. Likewise, if courts routinely set the 
standard of care too low, defendants will frequently under-invest in care.190  
On the other hand, the incentives for care set by a negligence rule are 
far less susceptible to distortions created by erroneous damage calculations, 
so long as the standard of care is optimally set. If the standard of care is set 
at the correct level, the defendant has an incentive to conform to that standard, 
and thus avoid a liability award, regardless of the level of damages. For 
example, consider the case just introduced where the court sets the liability 
award at double the accident costs. But, now consider the case under a 
negligence rule where the court accurately sets the standard of care. In this 
case, if the user adopts 0 hours care, her expected liability is $30. But if she 
 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 A related point is that a negligence defense rule may open the door to opportunistic 
behavior. Defendants who know of the patent may nevertheless document efforts at 
reasonable accident precaution in the hope that the paper trail may hide their intentional 
infringement. However, this would be a risky strategy for a defendant to adopt. In such cases, 
their infringement is willful. If the willfulness is discovered, they will face enhanced 
damages. The risk of hiding their intentional infringement in this manner would need to be 
weighed against the risk of enhanced damages. See generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing 
Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1427 (2018). 
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takes one hour care, she is not liable and only pays her cost of care, i.e. $3. If 
she adopts two hours of care, she is once again not liable and pays only the 
cost of care, i.e. $6. Thus, if the standard of care is set correctly, errors in 
damage calculations are insignificant, because the parties have the incentive 
to conform to the cost-justified care required by the negligence rule.191  
Unfortunately, strict liability plus contributory negligence is the worst 
of both worlds. As the technology user is subject to strict liability, her 
incentives are highly affected by miscalculations in calculating damages. In 
the example just discussed, distortions would likely occur in user care under 
such a liability rule. The patentee avoids liability only by conforming to the 
reasonable care standard. As a result, the user assumes the patentee takes such 
care, and that she will be held strictly liable. Thus, her options are to take 0 
hour care (for $30), 1 hour care (for $25), or two hours care (for $24). She 
will minimize her costs by taking two hours care, even though this is higher 
than optimal. Meanwhile, if the standard of reasonable care is set incorrectly 
in the contributory negligence analysis, then the patentee will have an 
incentive to conform to that sub-optimal standard. Thus, as compared to strict 
liability and negligence liability, strict liability plus contributory negligence 
yields both types of error cost. 
A negligence rule with a contributory negligence defense and a 
comparative negligence rule are also problematic. Compared to a simple 
negligence rule, which would distort the incentives for the technology user 
only, errors in setting the negligence standard under these rules would distort 
the incentives bilaterally.  
4. Externalities 
Until now, the analysis has assumed that the private harm suffered by 
the patent owner is a perfect proxy for the public harm suffered when an 
 
191 Theoretically it is possible for too low damages to result in distortions even under a 
negligence regime. It is not impossible, for example, for a technology user to prefer to select 
pay incorrectly low damages rather than invest in cost-justified precautionary measures, see 
Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 136 (2011) (assuming when the 
standard of care is optimal, “injurers will be under deterred with too-low damages” but will 
be “optimally deterred with efficient and too-high damages.”). However, this problem would 
seem to occur infrequently in patent law. The miscalculation of damages would need to be 
very significant to result in a case where the user technology user would prefer to select 
damages rather than take precaution. For example, take the case where the expected accident 
(pA) costs are $110,000, and the defendant can take care for a cost of $10,000 which will 
reduce the expected accident costs by 10%. In such a case, care is efficient as $10,000 in care 
will result in a $11,000 reduction in expected harm. Therefore, under a negligence rule, the 
defendant’s choice is to either take care for $10,000 or expect to pay $110,000 in liability. If 
the court incorrectly sets the liability award at, e.g. $100,000, or $75,000, or $50,000, the 
same result will occur. Only if the damages are set very significantly too low, i.e. below 
$10,000 will the technology user’s incentives be distorted. 
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accidental infringement occurs. However, frequently this is not the case. 
Often inventions come with significant positive externalities (or spillovers) 
which cannot be captured by the patent monopoly.192 For example, imagine 
in our scenario in Table 2, the patent at issue is a drug which alleviates the 
symptoms of the common cold. The patent enables the inventor to charge 
producers of the drug $100. However, frequent use of the medicine by people 
in society may have the further benefit of reducing the spread of the cold virus 
(due to less frequent coughing and sneezing). Thus, the value to society that 
accompanies the production of the drug may be higher than the patentee’s 
private value, e.g. $200. In order for society to minimize the cost of accidents, 
the user must take cost-justified care, taking into account the cost of the 
precautions and the expected accident costs. But the expected accident costs 
must reflect the social loss that would accompany the patent accident, not 
merely the private loss caused to the patentee.  
Similarly, we have so far assumed that the utility the user receives 
from production of her product is a perfect proxy for the public good 
associated with the user’s technical activity. Once again, this is not 
necessarily the case. The technical activity of the user may provide significant 
positive externalities beyond that captured in the user’s private utility. For 
example, if the invention is a wireless network technology, a user may create 
a type of cell phone employing wireless emails. The user’s product may be a 
commercial success, yielding private utility for herself, but widespread use 
of this product may have even greater social benefits, because the new 
product enables faster communication between people in society leading to 
better information transfer. When seeking to minimize the social costs of 
accidents, the user should take cost-justified precautions taking into account 
the public, not merely the private, benefit produced by the user’s technical 
activity.  
However, under a strict liability rule, users will not take into account 
positive externalities. Take the cold medicine example to illustrate. The 
private harm that the user’s use causes the patentee remains $100. Thus, prior 
to the accident occurring, the expected accident costs, and thus the expected 
liability costs, are the same as those presented in Table 3. Thus, the user will 
still adopt 1 hour care. However, this is no longer optimal. Assuming the 
probability of the accident occurring remains the same, if the user takes 0 
hours care, the expected accident costs are now $30; if the user takes 1 hour 
care, the expected accident costs are $20; and if the user takes 2 hours care, 
the expected accident costs are $16. Thus, 0 hours care yields a social loss of 
30; 1 hour care yields a total social cost of $17; and two hours care yields a 
total social cost of $10. Accordingly, taking a second hour of care would be 
 
192 See Frischman & Lemley, supra note 175. 
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cost justified and minimize society’s total social cost. Nevertheless, the user 
will not take this optimal level because the court has not considered the public 
harm caused by the infringement.  
One way to rectify this problem would be for the court to alter the 
liability award to reflect the public harm rather than the merely private 
harm.193 But there are significant practical obstacles to doing so. Patent 
infringement usually results in a compensatory damage award, where the 
remedy seeks to redress the private harm.194 Altering this would require the 
court to provide a supra-compensatory remedy. This leads to a “windfall” 
problem i.e. the patentee receives more damages through a court-imposed 
remedy than the patent allows her to get on the open market through 
licensing.195 The patentee thus has an incentive to sue for damages rather than 
license the technology. If reducing accident costs is the goal, it is counter-
intuitive at best to provide patentees with an incentive not to license the 
invention, but instead to prefer for damages once an accidental infringement 
occurs. Unless the patent right could be altered in some way to enable the 
rights holder to capture the full social value of the invention (a suggestion 
itself of dubious value),196 then avoiding perverse incentives would require 
avoiding higher damage awards.  
On the other hand, a negligence rule can be adjusted to reflect 
externalities, and thus incentivize the user to take such external cost into 
account. If the patented invention produces substantial positive externalities, 
then the court can take this into account when assessing the harm caused by 
the accidental infringement. As a result, the user would be required to take a 
greater level of care in order to avoid liability. Alternatively, if the user’s own 
activities involve substantial positive externalities, the court can increase the 
 
193 One interesting example of such damages recalibration can be found in William Lee 
and A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L 
REV, 385 (2016) (arguing that damages need to be reformed in various ways because of the 
inability in many fields to preclear patents). As a result of this, and similar proposals on 
patent damage reforms, see e.g. Golden, supra note 00, this Article is assuming that courts 
are capable of adjusting damages roughly in proportion to the positive externality. An 
alternative assumption and analysis was made in Bracha & Goold’s work on Copyright 
Accidents, supra note 17 at 1051-56. 
194 See e.g. 35U.S.C. §284 (“the court shall award . . . damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement . . . in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention by the infringer . . . .” ).  For criticism, see Ted Sichleman, Purging Patent Law of 
‘Private Law’ Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 516 (2014). See also John, Principles for Patent 
Remedies 86 TEX. L REV 505 (2010). 
195 See generally Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Windfall From Punitive 
Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992). 
196 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031 (2005). 
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cost of the precaution in the reasonable care standard to reflect this value; 
once again the user would conform to this appropriate standard.  
However, a negligence standard will not encourage the patentee to 
take appropriate care, taking into account positive externalities. Assuming the 
user conforms to the standard of care, the patentee only bears the private costs 
of the accident ( her private care costs and the private expected accident costs) 
and not the public costs of the accident, (the private cost of preventing the 
accident plus the public expected accident costs). As a result, the patentee 
will select a level of care that minimizes the private cost of the patent accident 
but not necessarily the public cost. Both a negligence rule with a contributory 
negligence defense and a comparative negligence rule has the same 
unfortunate outcome.  
Strict liability with a contributory negligence defense is arguably the 
best rule for internalizing third-party externalities. The patentee must take 
reasonable care to avoid being held contributorily negligent. The standard of 
reasonable care can be adjusted to reflect public externalities caused by the 
patented invention (the cost of care are increased) or on the user’s side (the 
cost of precaution is increased). Assuming the patentee takes due care, the 
user is then held strictly liable, and the damages can be changed to reflect 
either the value of the user’s or the patentee’s technical activity for society. 
Unlike a simple strict liability rule, however, this does not yield a windfall 
problem. In order to receive a liability award, the patentee must take 
reasonable care to avoid the accident. Thus, if a patentee were to take less 
than optimal care in the hope of claiming large damage awards, they would 
receive no damage award at all.  
D.  Summary 
Table 6 summarizes the discussion from Sections B and C. Analyzing 
the table reveals not only that some form of negligence rule is preferable to a 
strict liability rule, but also that the optimal liability rule is either a simple 
negligence rule, or a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence 
defense. After discussing these options, this Section concludes with some 
additional considerations that, in this author’s view, tip the scales in favor of 
a simple negligence rule.  
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Table 6: A summary of primary and secondary considerations 
 User Care Patent 
Owner 
Care 
Externalities 
Internalized 
Administrative 
Cost 
Error Cost 
No Liability Not 
Optimal 
Optimal No None None 
Strict Liability  Optimal Not 
Optimal 
User Internalizes Moderate Moderate 
Simple 
Negligence 
Optimal Optimal User Internalizes Moderate Moderate 
Strict Liability + 
Contributory 
Negligence 
Optimal Optimal Owner + User 
Internalizes 
Moderate High 
Negligence + 
Contributory 
Negligence 
Optimal Optimal User Internalizes High High 
Comparative 
Negligence 
Optimal Optimal User Internalizes High High 
 
 Some version of a negligence liability rule is preferable to either a 
strict liability or no liability rule because such a rule generates incentives for 
bilateral care. As this is the primary consideration and most important value, 
strict liability and no liability can easily be rejected as inappropriate liability 
rules. On the other hand, both comparative negligence and negligence with a 
contributory negligence defense also provide incentives for bilateral care, but 
each come with high error and administrative costs; these two liability rules 
can therefore be easily rejected because of the secondary considerations.  
 The best option is therefore either a simple negligence rule or a strict 
liability plus contributory negligence defense liability rule. Both of these 
rules encourage the technology user and the patent owner to take cost-
justified precautions to avoid the accident occurring, and thus are likely to 
limit social cost.  On the most important criterion, these rules perform equally 
well. It is therefore down to secondary considerations to help determine 
which rule is preferable. However, the secondary considerations do not 
provide a clear winner. The most important secondary consideration, activity 
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levels, is unhelpful in this context, as the activities of both the patent owner 
and the technology user affect the probability of accidental infringement 
approximately equally. The remaining secondary considerations cut in 
different directions: while a strict liability plus contributory negligence rule 
involves higher error costs than negligence rule, such a rule also seems better 
placed to internalize third party positive externalities associated with the 
technical activity.  
 Although both rules have a legitimate claim to optimality, three 
additional considerations tip the scales in favor of a simple negligence rule. 
First, from the discussion in part II, it emerged that the contemporary patent 
accidents problem is caused significantly by patent owners taking less than 
optimal care. As the discussion of “notice failure” highlighted, the current 
patent system does not provide sufficient incentives for the patentee to 
provide full ownership information to the public.197 On the other hand, there 
is very little suggestion that the patent accident problem is the result of users 
taking less than optimal care.198 Therefore, while an optimal liability rule 
ought to ensure both parties have the right incentives, there is reason to 
believe that increasing the incentives for the patent owner is comparatively 
the most important goal. A simple negligence rule is preferable to strict 
liability plus contributory negligence rule from this perspective. Crucially, a 
simple negligence rule makes the patent owner the residual bearer of the 
harm, whereas strict liability plus contributory negligence makes the user the 
residual bearer of the harm. As a result, under a strict liability rule with 
contributory negligence defense, the patentee will only take the precautions 
necessary to conform to the due care standard. Under a negligence rule, the 
patentee will internalize the value of any additional cost-effective 
precautions that are not accounted for in the negligence standard (such as 
activity levels or any other non-foreseen variables). This is desireable in the 
 
197 Supra notes 85-88. 
198 Some anecdotal evidence to the contrary suggests that some firms instruct their 
employees not to read patents, in the hope of avoiding intentional infringement of patents, 
although doing so increases the risk of accidental infringement. See, e.g., Edwin H. Taylor 
& Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the Foundations of Patent Law that the 
Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMMS & ENT L.J.. 721, 737 (1998) (“As matters 
now stand many companies discourage employees from reading patents. This presumably 
lessens the chance that the company will be found to have knowledge of a patent. However, 
this defeats the basic purpose of the patents [sic] laws, dissemination of information.”);  
However, unlike the scale of the problems presented by notice failure, which are empirically 
well-documented, see Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, the scale of the problem of such 
deliberate shielding is not empirically well-grounded. Furthermore, under a negligence rule, 
the incentives for such behavior may be limited. Rather than instruct employees to refrain 
from reading patents, companies would be better served by employees being aware of 
neighboring patents and taking reasonable precautions to avoid infringement, as this would 
provide a complete defense. 
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contemporary environment where the patentee’s lack of incentives for care 
are a comparatively significant contributor to the accident problem.  
 Second, a negligence rule is preferable in situations where the 
patentee and user select their levels of care sequentially.199 In many 
situations, the patentee has the opportunity to select the level of care before 
the technology user. The patentee has the opportunity to decide whether to 
attach markings to a product, and in what form, and how to write the patent 
specification. Only later does the user decide how much time they will invest 
in searching for the patentee. Under a strict liability plus contributory 
negligence rule, this may lead to less than optimal incentives for the user. If 
the patentee is contributorily negligent and if the user can see this ex ante, 
then the user may fail to take reasonable care (knowing that any accidents 
which do occur will be attributed to the patentee’s carelessness). For 
example, if a patentee fails to attach notice to a product, a user, upon 
inspecting the product, may decide not to spend any further time searching 
for the patentee, even though doing so would help reduce accident costs, 
because the user accurately predicts that, if they do infringe a patent, they 
will not be held liable on account of the patentee’s contributory negligence. 
On the other hand, under a negligence rule, the user would still have the 
incentive to conform to the due care standard. 
 The third concern is litigation costs. So far, we have assumed that the 
strict liability and negligence rules lead to moderate administrative costs 
because while strict liability is easier for judges to apply than a negligence 
rule, the strict liability rule leads to more infringement cases which need to 
be resolved. However, we have also explored the possibility that limiting the 
overall volume of patent infringement cases would minimize costs, even if 
the complexity of some litigation would increase.200 Extending that line of 
analysis further, my hunch is that a simple negligence rule would not only be 
less costly than a strict liability rule, but would also be less costly than a strict 
liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense. This 
suspicion flows from a problem of information asymmetries. If a simple 
negligence rule is imposed, users can avoid litigation (or alternative dispute 
resolution) by responding to infringement allegations simply by stating what 
level of care they have taken. However, users do not have the same option 
necessarily under a strict liability plus contributory negligence rule. In many 
cases, users will not know what level of care the patentee has taken 
(especially if the patentee’s level of search was negligent). Often this 
information will only come out into the open at trial. As a result, without this 
information, many users will need to go to trial to establish the contributory 
 
199 On sequential decision making to the choice of liability rule, see Landes & Posner, 
supra note 159, at 76-77, and Shavell, supra note 34, at 15 n.14.  
200 Supra note 180-81 and accompanying text. 
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negligence defense, whereas they would not need to do so to prove their lack 
of negligence. If this is true in a substantial amount of cases, administrative 
costs would be lowest if a simple negligence rule were to be adopted.  
 IV.  IMPLEMENTING NEGLIGENCE 
 Part III demonstrated that either a simple negligence rule or a strict 
liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense minimizes 
the social loss associated with patent accidents. Furthermore, Part III 
concluded with a number of reasons for preferring a simple negligence rule. 
This Part accordingly turns to issues of implementation. Section A examines 
two legal regimes in more detail – the U.S. and U.K. – and asks: How closely 
do these current legal regimes approximate the ideal liability rule? It 
demonstrates that the U.K. regime comes closer to the ideal regime because 
U.K. law denies damages in cases where the defendant did not know nor had 
“reasonable grounds” for supposing that the patent existed.201 Armed with 
these insights, Section B proposes a “patent negligence” defense. In accident 
cases, defendants ought not be held liable when they have taken reasonable 
care to avoid the accidental infringement. Section C illustrates how this rule 
would apply to a range of accidental infringement cases. 
A.  Existing Legal Regimes 
We shall first turn our attention to U.S. patent law (which may be 
described as a “quasi-contributory negligence regime”), and thereafter to 
U.K. patent law (which may be described as a “quasi-negligence regime”).  
1. U.S. Patent Act 
Under current U.S. law, one who accidentally infringes a patent will 
be held strictly liable. Typically, the patent holder is awarded damages and 
an injunction.202 However, there is an exception in Section 287 of the Patent 
Act.203 This section states that “patentees, and persons making, offering for 
sale, or selling within the United States any patented article” may give notice 
to the public of the patent by attaching the word “patent” and the patent 
number; if such marking is not given, then the patent holder will not receive 
damages unless they have given the infringer actual notice (but will still 
receive an injunction).204 The purpose of this marking requirement was 
introduced to reduce the frequency of inadvertent patent infringement.205  
 
201 See infra notes 219-221. 
202 35 USC 283-4. 
203 35 USC 287. 
204 35 U.S.C. §287. 
205 Wine Ry. Appliances Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1926) (the 
purpose of patent marking is to provide “protection against deception by unmarked patented 
articles, and requires nothing unreasonable of patentees”); Motorola, Inc. v. United States v. 
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However, the marking requirement has been interpreted narrowly by 
courts.206 In particular, the requirement only applies in cases where the 
patentee produces products.207 As a result, the marking “duty” does not apply 
in cases where the patentee does not produce a product. Therefore, as 
interpreted by courts, there is no duty to mark nor give notice in cases where 
the patent covers a process rather than a product.208 Furthermore, there is no 
marking duty in cases of idle or non-commercialized patents (that is, patents 
relating to products, but where the patent holder does not commercially 
market any products).209 These types of patents – both process and idle 
patents – are particularly relevant in the context of patent assertion entities 
(or patent “trolls”). Patent assertion entities by definition do not produce any 
products, and therefore are under no marking duty; their revenue instead 
flows from licensing the patented technology. In these cases, there is 
currently no marking duty, and accordingly this business model encourages 
patent accidents.  
How does the U.S. liability regime compare to the ideal negligence 
rule? To answer this, it is helpful to split the cases into two groups: those 
where the marking duty does not apply, and those where the marking duty 
does apply. In the former, the liability regime is a straightforward strict 
liability rule: damages and injunctions are awarded regardless of the level of 
care either party has taken to prevent the accidents occurring. On the other 
hand, in cases where the marking duty applies, the liability rule comes close 
to a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense. 
That is, the user will be liable unless she can demonstrate that the patentee 
was contributorily negligent in failing to provide appropriate notice.  
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the current liability regime 
governing cases where the marking duty applies differs from that of a 
standard contributory negligence rule. First, the contributory negligence 
defense is implemented using rules rather than standards. Legal theory 
demonstrates how the same legal directive can be implemented in a variety 
of more or less precise ways.210 For example, in order to encourage drivers 
 
729 F.2d 735, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“a fundamental rationale supporting section 287 is 
supplying notice to prevent innocent infringement.”). Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard tire co., 704, 
f.2D 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ([t]he purpose of this provision is to give patentees the 
proper incentive to mark their products and thus place the world on notice of the existence 
of the patent.”). 
206 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 12, at 840-45; Chiang, supra note 11, at 43-9. 
207 Wine Ry. Appliances Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398. 
208 Supra note 206. 
209 Id.  
210 See generally, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, (1992); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).  
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to drive at a reasonable speed, a legal rule could be drafted using a vague and 
flexible standard (i.e. drivers must drive “reasonably”), or alternatively, a 
more precise and more rigid rule could be adopted (i.e. drivers must drive 
under 30mph). The benefits and costs of each regime are discussed in detail 
in a voluminous literature.211 Typically, when legal scholars discuss 
contributory negligence, they make reference to a contributory negligence 
rule drafted using standards (i.e. the defendant will be liable unless the 
plaintiff failed to take “reasonable care”). However, in Section 287, the 
contributory negligence standard is not drafted using a vague and flexible 
standard, but instead using a bright line rule: the patentee will be 
contributorily negligent if she failed to appropriately mark the product or 
provide the user with actual notice.212  
Second, and more significantly, even if the plaintiff is contributorily 
negligent, they may still be awarded an injunction. This is unusual for a 
negligence rule. As Calabresi and Melamed demonstrated, “property rules” 
(i.e. entitlements protected by injunctive relief) are appropriate in cases where 
the parties can bargain ex ante.213 This allows the market to allocate goods to 
the actors that value them the most. However, where transaction costs prevent 
ex ante bargaining, then a liability rule ought to be imposed, i.e. injunctive 
relief ought to be denied and damages imposed.214 The question thereafter 
becomes what type of liability rule ought to be imposed: strict liability or 
some form of negligence liability rule? As highlighted by others previously, 
patent accidents involve cases where ex ante bargaining cannot take place, 
and therefore a property rule is unhelpful, and a liability rule ought to be 
imposed.215 This current Article is concerned with the next step of the 
analysis and suggests a negligence rule is preferable to a strict liability rule. 
However, the current Section 287 rule is a hybrid in that it denies damages 
when the patentee was contributorily negligent, but nevertheless allows the 
patentee to receive an injunction. 
Presumably, this difference can be explained on the grounds that after 
a court has found infringement, the transaction costs between the user and the 
patentee are reduced: the user now knows whom to contact to license the 
technology.216 Therefore, while the court should impose a negligence liability 
 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
214 Id. at 1105-10. 
215 Supra note 15. 
216 This reasoning was implicit in the Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 
S.C.R. 902 case, where the court focused not on the initial potentially accidental 
infringement, but instead on what actions Schmeiser ought to have taken after having found 
the patented seeds on his farm land. 
56 Patent Accidents [9-Sep-19 
rule for past conduct, future conduct ought to be treated as non-accidental and 
thus governed by a property rule to encourage effective market transactions.  
Yet this reasoning leaves much to be desired. In many instances, 
injunctive relief will lead to a “hold-up” problem.217 Frequently by this point, 
the technology user will have built a business around the use of the 
technology, and therefore not be in a position to easily carry on business 
without it. There is a substantial chance that technology users who become 
accidental infringers will become “locked in” and be unable to change their 
business to avoid the patent infringement. In such circumstances, injunctive 
relief allows the patentee to shut the user’s business down, unless the user 
pays a very high licensing fee (i.e. above the rate that the user would have 
paid if they had truly bargained ex ante). To illustrate, in the RIM v NTP 
case, NTP’s injunctive relief enabled them to extract a $613 million license 
fee from RIM.218 The potential for receiving a highly lucrative injunction in 
turn distorts the incentives for patentee care: by taking less than optimal care, 
they may lose the possibility of obtaining damages, but may increase their 
ability to receive an injunction which may be even more profitable. Thus the 
presence of ex post injunctions threatens the very goal the law should 
achieve, i.e. that both parties take an appropriate level of care to prevent 
accidents ex ante.  
2. U.K. Patent Act 
Like the U.S., liability for accidental infringement in the U.K. is 
imposed strictly. But also like the U.S., damages will be refused in some 
cases. Section 62 of the Patent Act 1977 states that no damages will be 
awarded against a defendant who was not aware of the infringement “and had 
no reasonable grounds for supposing” that the patent existed.219 If a patented 
product contains the word “patent” and the relevant patent number, then the 
user shall be deemed to have reasonable grounds for supposing the patent 
existed.220 Courts have held that the “reasonable grounds” test is objective, 
and in many cases compared it to the “reasonable person” negligence 
standard.221  
Recent cases illustrate the rule’s scope. In Collingwood Lightning Ltd 
v Aurora222, the patentee produced a fire-resistant LED downlight. The 
 
217 See generally, Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (2007). 
218 Supra note 5. 
219 Patent Act 1977, s.62 
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221 See e.g. Schenck Rotec GmbH v Universal Balancing Ltd [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat) 
(“The facts known to Universal Balancing at the time were not such that would lead a 
reasonable person to think the patent existed.”). 
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defendants alleged they had no grounds to know of the patent, but the court 
disagreed: the patented product had been featured in a trade magazine (as the 
magazine’s “Innovative Product of the Year”) with wide circulation, and 
which was frequently read by the defendant’s technical staff.223   
In contrast, the defense was successfully argued in Micromatic A/S.224 
In this case, the claimant produced a patented valve coupling to stop valves 
in pressurized containers (e.g. beer kegs) from “shooting out” when 
removed.225 Crucial to the functioning of the invention was a “lower pin”.226 
However, the patent did not explain the function of this lower pin.227 After 
the function of the lower pin was established at trial, the court held that the 
patent was invalid for lack of novelty and inventive step.228 But the court 
went one step further and stated that had it found the patent valid, it would 
nevertheless have not awarded damages because, in not explaining the 
functioning of the lower pin, the patent was not drafted with “reasonable skill 
and knowledge” and thus the defendants had no reasonable grounds for 
supposing they infringed the patent.229  
Finally, in Schenck Rotec v Universal Balancing, the plaintiff 
produced a device and a method for fixing balancing weights to a rotor.230 
The defendants was a competitor in the market.231 The claimant alleged 
infringement in 2010 and the defendants claimed Section 62 applied.232 
Schenck argued that the defendants ought to have performed a search of the 
patent register; they argued that there were only four significant players in 
the propshaft balancing industry and that all other incumbents patented their 
inventions. However, the judge disagreed.233 The judge found that the 
“possibility for new developments in this field is limited”234, and that the 
defendants had not seen the patentee’s brochures or literature describing their 
product as “patented”.235 As a result, the court found that the facts known to 
the defendants “at the time were not such that would lead to a reasonable 
person to think the patent existed” and nor “would these facts lead a 
 
223 Id.  
224 [2001] 5 WLUK 209 (Ch D (Patents Ct)) 
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
229 Id.  
230 [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat). 
231 Id.  
232 Id.  
233 Id.  
234 Id. at para 223. 
235 Id.  
58 Patent Accidents [9-Sep-19 
reasonable person to think they should conduct patent searches” to see if their 
product infringed a competitor’s patents.236  
 The U.K. provision is best described as a “quasi-negligence” rule 
where the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove their lack of 
negligence. Unlike the U.S., courts are directed to examine the user’s level 
of care rather than the patentee’s. In cases where the patentee markets 
products, there is an additional evidentiary rule: if the patentee attached 
appropriately notice the court may infer the defendant behaved negligently. 
But, unlike the U.S. provision, the negligence rule is not limited to these 
cases, and accordingly, the rule is broader in scope than Section 287 of the 
U.S. Patent Act. The negligence rule applies to all forms of accidental patent 
infringement and not merely infringement of patented products. However, 
like the U.S. law, injunctions are still routinely awarded to restrain future 
activity. 
 In sum, both the U.K. and U.S. law already adopt some mechanisms 
to encourage bilateral care, and in this sense approximate some form of 
negligence rule. However, both legal regimes implement that negligence rule 
imperfectly. Armed with this insight, we can turn to reform proposals.   
B.  A Patent Negligence Defense 
This Article recommends that countries dealing with the problem of 
patent accidents adopt some version of a “patent negligence” defense.237 
Implementing such a rule would require courts to first determine whether the 
infringement was accidental or not. This would require the judge to consider 
the ex ante position of the defendant. If a reasonable person would have 
foreseen that the planned conduct would almost certainly infringe a patent, 
the infringement should be classed as intentional, and subject to the normal 
procedures (including supra-compensatory damages for willful 
infringement). In these cases, nothing need change. On the other hand, if the 
court determines that a reasonable person would only have foreseen a 
substantial risk that the planned conduct may amount to a patent 
infringement, then courts ought to apply a negligence rule. Courts in these 
cases should be directed to assess whether the technology user adopted all 
reasonable care to mitigate the risk, using the Learned Hand formula as a 
guide to determining whether a given precautionary measure was reasonable 
or not. If a defendant is deemed to have failed to take all reasonable care 
available, then the defendant ought to be held liable for damages. If, however, 
the defendant did take all reasonable care, then the defendant ought to be held 
not liable, and subject to neither damages nor injunction. 
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This proposal recommends implementing a negligence rule via legal 
standards rather than a more precise set of rules. Courts ought to have a broad 
discretion to consider the whether the defendant adopted all “reasonable” 
precautionary measures in the circumstances. The alternative would be to 
define a set of precise rules which approximate the negligence determination, 
e.g. the defendant must be found negligent if she failed to search the patent 
registry. The pros and cons of such rules are well-established in the 
literature.238 While proxy rules provide more legal certainty, their 
inflexibility frequently leads to over- and under-inclusiveness.239 For 
example, courts could adopt a rule that any user who fails to perform a search 
of the patent register will be considered negligent. However, such a rule is 
over-inclusive: it holds liable those who fail to search when it would not be 
reasonable to do so (such as the defendant in Schenck).240 The rule would also 
be under-inclusive: some users would be held not liable for infringement on 
the grounds that they searched the register, even though they failed to take 
some alternative care measure which may have been cost-justified in the 
circumstances (e.g. inspecting products for patent information).  
A good example of the potential for over- and under- inclusiveness in 
this area comes from contemporary U.S. law. Section 287 was drafted to 
encourage patentee care and prevent accidental infringement.241 But it is 
under-inclusive in that the rule does not encourage patentee care from those 
who hold patents on processes or non-commercialized products, and it is 
over-inclusive in exempting from liability defendants who have not infringed 
accidentally (i.e. those who knowingly infringe but are shielded from 
damages because the patentee has failed to provide appropriate notice). While 
this over- and under-inclusivity could theoretically be resolved by creating 
an even more fine-grained set of rules, I am unconvinced this would be an 
efficient approach to legal design. As demonstrated in Part II, the situations 
in which accidental patent infringement occurs are highly heterogenous, and 
accordingly accidental infringement, like accidents in other parts of tort law, 
is a problem best solved by increasing judicial discretion to apply a flexible 
standard.242  
Nevertheless, rules will still play a part in the patent negligence 
defense. Courts undoubtedly will over time formulate evidentiary rules that 
indicate when a user has behaved negligently.243 This will increase certainty 
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incrementally to an appropriate level. A starting point should be the example 
in contemporary U.K. law. In cases of patented products, courts should adopt 
an evidentiary rule that if the patentee has attached the word “patent” and a 
patent number, then the defendant is presumably negligent. This, however, 
ought to take the form of a rebuttable presumption. If the defendant can prove 
that, despite the existence of the patent information marking, that they took 
all reasonable care, then they nevertheless ought not to be held liable.   
The proposed defense is an affirmative defense. The burden of proof 
falls on the user to establish the defense once a prima facie case of 
infringement has been established. While clearly a change to patent doctrine, 
this would provide the simplest and least intrusive intervention into the 
existing system. Under this proposal, most patent cases would remain 
unaltered: in non-accident cases, patent cases would proceed as they currently 
do. Indeed, in many accident cases, there would be very little change: many 
defendants who do not have the required evidence to prove reasonable care 
are more likely to reach a settlement, rather than attempt defense. The only 
cases that would change are those in where the defendant has a plausible 
argument that they adopted all reasonable care.  
As will be recalled from Part II.C., a number of authors raised 
concerns about the feasibility of adopting a negligence rule. At this point, we 
can see how adopting a patent negligence affirmative defense would avoid or 
mitigate those concerns. Blair and Cotter argue that the administrative costs 
of a negligence rule are too high.244 The first, and most important response, 
to this concern is that the administrative costs of strict liability are already 
very high: strict liability leads to large numbers of infringement claims which 
would not reach court under a negligence liability rule.245 Given the Bessen 
and Meurer findings on the explosion of patent litigation in recent years due 
to the number of infringement claims, the claim that that strict liability is 
administratively less costly than a negligence rule invites questions.246 
Furthermore, not only will those administrative costs be mitigated by the 
doctrine of stare decisis, but these “extra” costs will only apply in a subset of 
patent infringement cases, namely accident cases.  
Similarly, Robert Merges defends strict liability on two grounds.247 
First, Merges argues that that proving “copying” would be costly for patent 
holders.248 But, while there is certainly truth in Merges’s concern, this Article 
does not make such a proposal. Instead, the Article proposes that the 
defendant avoid liability by proving they took reasonable care to prevent 
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infringement. Accordingly, the legal costs for the patent holder will not be 
significantly altered. Secondly, Merges argues that if knowledge of the patent 
was a pre-condition for patent infringement, then technology users will have 
an incentive to shield their research staff from technology subject to a patent, 
in order to avoid those researchers from copying patented material.249 
However, in the vast majority of cases, shielding researchers will not qualify 
as a “reasonable” precautionary measure. Indeed, as Merges highlights, the 
costs of shielding in terms of lost knowledge transfer will be great, and the 
benefits in terms of reduced accident prevention will often be slight.250 
Accordingly, a defendant who fails to adopt such shielding tactics would not 
be deemed negligent. As a result, innovative companies would not have an 
incentive to take such inefficient measures.  
By far the best way for such a rule to be implemented would be 
through legislation. Ideally the legislator ought to enact a provision stating 
that in cases of accidental infringement, the defendant will be subject to 
compensatory damages and an injunction if she has failed to take all 
reasonable care. The legislation should then further define an infringement as 
accidental if, prior to performing the technical activity, the defendant could 
not establish with reasonable certainty whether the technical activity would 
be infringing behavior or not. The legislation should also establish the Hand 
Formula as the test for whether a precautionary measure is reasonable or not. 
In the U.S. an ideal place for this defense would be Section 271 of the Patent 
Act, which currently defines infringement (proposed subsection i.).251 
Likewise, in the U.K. Section 62 (on the “Meaning of Infringement”) would 
serve as an appropriate destination.252  
Alternatively, courts could also take the lead implementing a 
negligence rule. In the U.K., this would require only a modest change in 
practice. The law already directs the court to deny damages in cases where 
the defendant behaved reasonably.253 The only additional step required would 
be for courts to deny injunctions in the same cases. Currently, while routinely 
awarded, injunctions will be denied in certain cases, such as where the 
injunction would be oppressive on the defendant.254 In cases where the 
defendant could not be certain of the infringement ex ante, and has taken the 
care of a reasonable person in ascertaining the status of the technology, it 
would be oppressive to award an injunction and thereby threaten to shut down 
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a socially desirable business. Moreover, article 3(2) of the EU Enforcement 
Directive requires that remedial measures be imposed on the basis of their 
proportionality, amongst other things.255 Denying the injunction in such cases 
would arguably be proportional to the user’s level of culpability.  
In the U.S., courts would need to adopt a more interventionist 
approach. Unlike the U.K., in many cases, the liability standard in the U.S. is 
strict, and only in some cases is a contributory negligence defense partially 
adopted.256 Yet, the Patent Act does not at any point state that the liability for 
patents must be strict.257 The question of fault in patent law has long been a 
judicial decision. Lynda J. Oswald demonstrates in her history of patent 
infringement that U.S. courts adopted strict liability for patent infringement 
in the nineteenth century.258  Courts and early treatise writers argued that 
patents were a form of property and imported concepts into patent from 
property law, including the strict liability infringement rule.259 This rule was 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hogg v Emerson in 1850 and has 
remained part of patent law ever since.260 When Congress revised statutory 
patent law, there was little questioning of whether accidental infringement 
ought to be strict or fault-based.261 Courts today retain the authority to modify 
this judicially-created rule. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit have the authority to hold that a defendant only be held liable for 
negligent accidental infringements of patent rights. Therefore, in the absence 
of Congressional action, courts could find that in accidental infringement 
cases, a defendant who proves that she has taken all reasonable care, is not 
within the definition of an infringer, and thus not liable. Section 287 would 
thereafter layer over this basic liability rule. The underlying liability rule 
would be negligence, and Section 287 would provide an evidentiary rule that, 
in cases of products, a defendant is taken to be liable if the patentee attached 
appropriate marking to the product. 
C.  Illustrative Applications 
Having proposed the introduction of a “patent negligence” defense, 
this Section considers how such a defense would apply in certain high profile 
accident cases. In particular, the cases of NTP v RIM, Rambus v Infineon, and 
Monsanto v Schmeiser will be examined. These cases are selected because 
together they illustrate how the negligence rule would apply to a number of 
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areas of contemporary concern in patent law: patent thickets, patent trolls, 
strategic behavior, and self-replicating technologies. The analysis shows how 
these are not isolated problems facing the patent system, but instead are the 
emanations of a deeper, more significant, accident crisis that remains 
unaddressed. 
1. NTP v RIM: Patent Thickets and Patent Trolls 
As previously highlighted, the NTP case is illustrative of the problems 
caused by patent thickets, particularly in the smartphone sector, and is further 
interesting because the plaintiff was a non-practicing entity.262 How would 
such a case be analyzed under this Article’s proposed negligence rule? To 
answer that question we must ask: Did RIM take all reasonable measures to 
avoid the infringement? In other words, did RIM behave negligently? Or 
were there any precautionary measures that NTP could have adopted which 
would have helped avoid this particular accident?  The following section 
tentatively sketches the argument that RIM did not behave negligently. 
However, this conclusion is tentative. As will be seen, whether RIM behaved 
without due care is a difficult question, with finely balanced arguments on 
either side.  
What precautionary measures were available to RIM to prevent the 
Blackberry’s infringement of NTPs patents? One obvious precautionary 
measure would be to complete a search of the patent register. Under normal 
circumstances searching the patent register is a reasonable precautionary 
measure and one we would expect technology users to perform. In most 
cases, the benefit of searching the register will far outweigh the cost doing so 
imposes: the reduction in expected accident costs will often be great 
compared to a relatively modest cost. From my investigation into the case, I 
cannot find evidence that RIM did in fact perform a patent search. Assuming 
that they did not, then we normally would conclude that RIM failed to take 
all reasonable precautions for preventing the accident. 
However, the RIM case is not an ordinary one. In this case, it is 
conceivable that performing a patent search would have been largely 
ineffective due to the existence of a patent thicket. As highlighted earlier, the 
smartphone sector is one which suffers heavily from the existence of multiple 
overlapping patents. 263 Accordingly, the ability for RIM to find all of the 
relevant patents through searching the register would have been very low 
indeed. If RIM attempted to find all the relevant patents, it would require a 
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very significant amount of investment of time and labor into the searching 
process. Before RIM produced the Blackberry, therefore, their option was to 
perform a costly patent search that was likely to yield little marginal benefit 
in terms of reduction in expected accident costs (as demonstrated by the fact 
that when the USPTO searched the register during RIM’s later patent 
application, it too did not uncover NTP’s patent). This may explain why RIM 
seemingly did not perform the search. As we have seen, under a strict liability 
rule, the user has an incentive to take cost-justified precautionary measures. 
This precautionary measure was arguably not cost-justified and thus it is little 
surprise it was not taken.264 Accordingly, Bessen and Meurer conclude that it 
was likely inefficient for RIM to perform such a search.265  
Was searching the register the only possible precautionary measure? 
Perhaps not. In January 2000, NTP sent RIM a letter explaining their belief 
that RIM were infringing their technology.266 This arrived 16 months before 
NTP initiated a patent infringement suit in Virginia.267 How ought a 
reasonable company respond to such a letter? Upon receiving an infringement 
notice, it is arguable that a reasonable precautionary measure would be to hire 
patent attorneys to analyze the claims made by the patent holder, and 
determine whether there was indeed any infringement. It is not clear, 
however, whether RIM adopted such measures. At trial, some evidence was 
introduced to suggest that RIM had carefully considered the claims; while 
other evidence was presented that RIM ignored the letter.268 Assuming the 
letter was ignored, was that evidence that RIM failed to take all reasonable 
precautions? Perhaps. Although the argument could also be made that such 
letter arrived after RIM had commenced the patent infringement. By this 
point, the Blackberry device was being sold commercially. It is conceivable 
that analyzing the claims made in the letter would have imposed a cost on 
RIM which, due to the timing of the letter, would not have helped prevent the 
infringement in the first instance.  
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On the other hand, what, if anything could NTP have done to prevent 
the infringement? Most importantly, NTP could have informed RIM of their 
patents before RIM started selling the Blackberry. To demonstrate this point, 
we need some context surrounding the introduction of the Blackberry. From 
1995 to 1999, there were only a handful of producers selling pagers 
incorporating wireless technology: Motorola, US Robotics, Nokia, and 
RIM.269 After becoming a publicly traded company on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange in 1997,270 RIM entered this market with the production of the 
Inter@ctive 900 two-way Pager which allowed users to send and receive 
messages over the internet via a wireless data network known as Mobitex.271 
This product was commercially successful, and in 1997 was named the Top 
Product by “Wireless for the Corporate User” magazine.272 This was just one 
in a string of high publicity awards. Between 1997 and 1999 RIM won awards 
for Excellence in Innovation from the Network Computing Magazine, was 
voted High Technology Entrepreneur of the Year by the Canadian Advanced 
Technology Association, received the Editor’s Choice Award by CNET, the 
Mobility Award for Mobile insights from the Smithsonian, to name just a 
few.273 During the same time RIM had signed wireless handheld supply 
contracts with American Mobile, IBM, and Rogers Cantel (now AT&T).274 
The two-way Pager was so successful that by 1998 RIM were concerned 
about copycats producing similar pagers, and accordingly applied for a patent 
on their wireless technology.275 By 1999, the Blackberry was introduced and 
was already a heavily publicized and established product: Business Week 
called it the close to perfect pocket email, while celebrities such as Bill Gates 
and Pamela Anderson were already adopting it and promoting it.276  
In these circumstances, it would have been reasonable for NTP to 
inform RIM of their patents at an earlier date. NTP was a patent assertion 
entity, with a very limited number of patents related to wireless technology. 
A reasonable patent holder in these circumstances should consider who in the 
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industry may potentially be using their patented technology, and take simple 
measures to ensure that those potential users do not become accidental 
infringers – especially when, in areas affected by patent thickets, it is 
unreasonable to expect the patent register alone to fulfil this task. In this case, 
NTP only had to keep track of a handful of companies who were potentially 
infringing their patents: those few companies endeavoring to produce 
wireless email pagers. These companies, and RIM in particular, were not 
hidden from public view. Rather, as the proceeding discussion shows, their 
wireless pagers were very well publicized, and discussed in magazines 
dedicated to wireless technology. In these circumstances, if NTP adopted a 
little more care in monitoring the market and keeping wireless technology 
producers aware of their patent rights, then we would expect to a reduction 
in the chances of a patent accident occurring. If RIM were exculpated from 
liability, NTP and those similarly situated in the future, would have a clear 
incentive to take these precautionary measures.  
 The conclusion that RIM was not negligent is, however, tentative. 
Clearly more knowledge of the case facts would be necessary to come to a 
final conclusion. Under the current strict liability rule, the court is not 
obligated to assess the level of care taken by the parties. As a result, the court 
record in the RIM case does not clearly demonstrate the level of care RIM 
adopted nor the variables necessary to determining whether such care was 
reasonable. Therefore, it is possible that the defendant’s level of care was 
unreasonable. This is particularly true in relation to RIM’s failure to search 
the patent register. If so, then the defendant did indeed behave negligently 
and ought to be subject to a damages award (but not injunction).   
 Crucially however, even if RIM was found to be liable under a 
negligence rule, this would still help create incentives for bilateral care. In 
the future, parties in RIM’s situation could avoid damages by performing a 
reasonable patent search. Meanwhile, parties in NTP’s situation would also 
take precautionary measures: perceiving the likelihood that most users will 
perform a patent search and thus be found non-negligent, the patentee will 
increase their chances of revenue by making their ownership information 
more readily apparent to users.  
2. Rambus v Infineon: Strategic Behavior 
As discussed earlier, patentees can often “benefit from strategically 
hiding, obfuscating, and distorting” information contained in the patent.277 
We discussed the Rambus case as an example. In this case, Rambus waited 
until Infineon was “locked in” to using a standards-essential patent, before 
seeking and enforcing new patent claims.278 Only when Infineon adopted the 
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SDRAM technological standard did Rambus disclose their new patent claims 
and bring an infringement action.279  
Did Infineon behave negligently? The answer is almost certainly no! 
Infineon was an active participant in the JEDEC Standard Setting 
Organization, and responsibly inspected all patents which, according to the 
SSO’s rules, were related to the relevant standards. That included inspecting 
the relevant DRAM patent before making any manufacturing decisions. 
Having responsibly inspected the available patent information, Infineon 
began manufacturing. Only then did Rambus seek further claims, which when 
later issued, would potentially enjoin Infineon’s business. Of course, Infineon 
could have decided not to manufacture anything on the grounds that Rambus 
– a known patent assertion entity – may potentially seek continuations which 
would later enjoin their production. But such care would clearly have been 
excessive, resulting in a massive opportunity cost for both Infineon and its 
customers. We can be confident that Infineon, therefore, met its duty of care.  
Under a negligence rule, the incentives for this type of strategic 
behavior would diminish. Having adopted all reasonable measures of care, 
Infineon would not be liable to Rambus. Not only would Infineon avoid 
damages but they would also not be subject to an injunction. The 
consequence is that such strategic claiming would be completely unprofitable 
for Rambus. The financial incentive to secretly seek new claims, and to 
opportunistically trap the unwary, would be completely undercut.  
 
3. Monstanto v Schmeiser: Self-Replicating Technologies 
The Schmeiser case discussed above has generated much academic 
commentary. In particular, writers have questioned whether the defendant 
ought to have been subject to a strict liability rule if, as he claimed, the 
patented seeds accidentally made their way onto his land through cross-
fertilization. British treatise writers, Bently, Sherman, Gangjee and Johnson 
argue that in cases farmers “through no fault of their own, may be liable for 
patent infringement when a patented plant ‘invades’ their property”280 and 
highlight that similar problems could occur in relation to other self-
replicating technologies, such as genetically modified animals. Similarly, 
Christopher Holman argues that “while strict liability might be acceptable for 
most technologies, the ease with which seeds can spread and reproduce 
relatively autonomously raises serious public policy concerns.”281 But when 
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viewed through the lens of accident law, one sees this is not an isolated 
incident affecting only biotechnology and self-replicating technologies. This 
is merely one instance of the broader phenomenon of accidental 
infringement. And once again, a negligence liability rule would be the 
appropriate response to such a case.  
Assuming for now, the case was truly one of accidental infringement, 
both Percy Schmeiser and Monsanto could have taken steps to prevent the 
infringement occurring. Farmers in Percy Schmeiser’s position can limit the 
chances of becoming accidental patent infringers by “fencing out” the 
invading seeds: this involves creating buffer zones, erecting hedges and other 
barriers, and “temporal spacing” i.e. planting crops at different times of year 
from neighboring farms to limit the chance of cross-fertilization, or cleaning 
rented equipment thoroughly before use.282 All of these measures are costly, 
but do effectively reduce the possibility of an accident occurring. 
The patentee can equally take care to avoid the infringement. One 
famous example in the seed context is through employing “Gene Use 
Restriction Technologies” (GURTs).283 Genetically modified seeds can be 
further modified such that the plant’s offspring do not contain particular traits 
conferred by the transgenic seed; as a result, if the seed accidentally blows 
onto another’s land, the resulting progeny are not patent-infringing.284 But 
the precautionary measures at the patent holder’s disposal are not limited to 
complex technological measures. Like George Selden and the Model T, 
simply publicizing the nature of the risk to farmers would help.285 Farmers 
such as Schmeiser can only adopt effective precautionary measures if they 
are aware of the risk, and the patent holder can make this danger clearer 
through publicity. Likewise, the patent holder can also “fence in” the 
travelling seeds by erecting appropriate windbreaks or barriers. The patent 
holder could contribute financially to such initiatives or contractually require 
that users of their patented seeds do so as a condition of use.  As a result, 
moral philosopher Zoë Robaey argues that the duty to prevent such 
contamination is not to be borne entirely by the farmer, nor entirely by the 
patent holder, but that there is a “collective, or joint, imperative to act 
responsibly to limit or avoid contamination” through such cross-
pollination.286 
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How would adopting a negligence rule affect incentives in the 
Schmeiser case? Once again, the main difference would be that such a rule 
would create incentives for appropriate care on the patentee side. Under a 
strict liability rule, Schmeiser already faced incentives to adopt reasonable 
preventative measures. This would remain the case under a negligence rule. 
This is not only appropriate, but provides a better solution than simply 
exculpating all “passive infringers”. We should expect farmers in 
Schmeiser’s position to adopt reasonable measures. Failure to do so should 
result in the farmer bearing partial responsibility for the accidental 
infringement. But equally, farmers who do take reasonable measures to avoid 
the infringement ought to be exculpated, thus shifting part of the 
responsibility back onto the patent owner.   
 V. CONCLUSION 
Accidental patent infringement is a significant and growing problem. 
As the number of broad and amorphous patents grows, the probability that 
one will inadvertently infringe a patent increases. This Article has argued 
that, rather than deem all accidental infringers strictly liable, we ought to hold 
such defendants legally responsible only when they have failed to take 
reasonable care to avoid the infringement. Applying theoretical economic 
models found routinely in tort literature, the Article has analyzed the costs 
and benefits of the various liability rules which could apply to patent 
accidents. While current doctrine holds patentees strictly liable, this Article 
has found that either a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence 
defense or a simple negligence rule would improve social welfare. 
Accordingly, the Article recommends the introduction of a “patent 
negligence” defense. Defendants should be liable for accidental infringement 
of patents, but only when they have failed to take the care of a reasonable 
person. As Guido Calabresi, in relation to physical injury accidents, pointed 
out fifty years ago: “Our society is not committed to preserving life at any 
cost.”287 We should not be committed to preserving patents at any cost either! 
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